United States

Summary: In this Florida case, Appellant challenges his judgment and sentence for two counts of misdemeanor animal cruelty, asserting that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. The conviction stems from an incident in 2023, where Appellant discovered two dogs that killed three of his chickens. Appellant found the offending dogs a short distance later, where he shot and killed both dogs. At trial, the state did not contest Appellant's evidence and Appellant pleaded no contest to two counts of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor animal cruelty, while specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The trial court withheld adjudication and sentenced Appellant to concurrent terms of 11 months and 29 days of probation. On appeal here, the court observed that the plain language of section 767.03, titled "Good defense for killing dog," provides Appellant with a defense and the trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss. The dogs killed chickens, defined under Florida law as "domestic animals," and section 767.03 constitutes a good defense to killing dogs who were found killing livestock or domestic animals. The court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions to vacate Appellant's judgment and sentences.

Summary: This chapter of Nevada laws concerns the exhibition of "dangerous wild animals." Under the chapter, dangerous wild animal means elephants, primates (except humans), wolves, big cat species, and bears. A person shall not allow a dangerous wild animal to come in direct contact with a member of the public. A person who violates any provision of this chapter is subject to a civil penalty of not more than $20,000.

Summary: Florida voters approved Amendment 2 "Right to Fish and Hunt" in 2024. The ballot summary states, "Proposing an amendment to the State Constitution to preserve forever fishing and hunting, including by the use of traditional methods, as a public right and preferred means of responsibly managing and controlling fish and wildlife. Specifies that the amendment does not limit the authority granted to the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission under Section 9 of Article IV of the State Constitution." The measure was passed by a margin of 67.34% of yes to 32.66% of no votes.

Summary: Proposition 127 would have made it illegal to hunt bobcat, lynx, and mountain lions in Colorado. The measure failed with 44.53% voting yes and 55.47% voting no on the measure. According to the ballot language, "Proposition 127 would prohibit intentionally killing, wounding, pursuing, entrapping, or discharging a deadly weapon at bobcats, lynx, and mountain lions in Colorado. While the measure uses the term 'trophy hunting,' it bans all hunting, pursuing, or entrapping of bobcats, lynx, and mountain lions regardless of intent. Individuals convicted of any of these activities are subject to up to 364 days in jail, a fine of up to $1,000, or both, and a five-year prohibition on holding a license issued by Colorado Parks and Wildlife (CPW), with more stringent penalties for subsequent convictions."

Summary: This Idaho case addresses the recoverable damages for a pet owner following the death of a pet due to alleged veterinary malpractice and an unauthorized necropsy. The Schrivers sought non-economic damages, including emotional distress and loss of companionship, after their cat, Gypsy, died during a veterinary procedure and was subjected to a necropsy without their consent. The district court denied emotional distress damages under their trespass to chattels/conversion claim and granted summary judgment in favor of the veterinarian on claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and lack of informed consent. The court, however, applied the “value to owner” measure for economic damages, which the veterinarian cross-appealed. The court affirmed that pets are considered personal property under Idaho law, and damages for their loss are limited to economic value, excluding sentimental value or loss of companionship. Emotional distress damages are not recoverable under trespass to chattels or conversion claims but may be pursued under independent torts like intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court upheld the denial of negligent infliction of emotional distress, finding no duty of care owed by veterinarians to prevent emotional harm to pet owners. However, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim regarding the unauthorized necropsy, remanding it for jury determination as to whether the conduct was “extreme and outrageous.” The court also affirmed that lack of informed consent is not a standalone cause of action in veterinary malpractice cases, though it may inform claims of professional negligence. Finally, the court upheld the “value to owner” measure for economic damages, clarifying that it includes the pet’s unique characteristics but excludes sentimental value. The court denied the veterinarian’s request for attorney fees, as the primary issues of the litigation remain unresolved.

Summary: The Supreme Court of Ohio addressed whether R.C. 959.131(C), which prohibits causing serious physical harm to a companion animal, applies to all dogs and cats or only those that are "kept." The case arose from the conviction of Alonzo Kyles for animal cruelty after he poured bleach on a cat, causing injury. The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed Kyles's conviction, holding that the statute required the cat to be "kept" (i.e., cared for) to qualify as a companion animal. The Supreme Court disagreed, interpreting the statute’s use of "any dog or cat regardless of where it is kept" as expansive, protecting all dogs and cats irrespective of ownership or care. The Court reversed the appellate decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on Kyles's remaining arguments.

Summary: This Oklahoma case centers around a pit bull named Julian, who was being fostered from Tulsa Animal Welfare, a department within the City of Tulsa. The foster went on vacation and left the dog with a pet-sitter named Sarah Marshall. The foster of the dog was under contract with Tulsa Animal Welfare to provide care, but was informed that the dog could be removed at any time and she was not allowed to have others care for the dog without prior approval. The foster needed to go out of town and attempted to contact the Foster Coordinator who did not respond. Ultimately, the foster hired Marshall from Rover.com to care for the dog over the weekend. The dog arrived at Marshall's home and was placed with five other dogs. This caused a fight to break out and Marshall's hand was bitten and fractured in the process of breaking up the fight. Approximately six months later, Marshall sued the City of Tulsa alleging strict liability, common law negligence, and negligence per se. The City filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that Marshall was the owner of the dog at the time of the bite and the trial court granted the City's motion, finding Marshall was an “owner” of dog and could not recover under 4 O.S. § 42.1 and the City did not owe a duty to Marshall. Marshall then filed the instant appeal, alleging that she was not an owner of Julian but only a temporary boarder and that City has the legal right of possession of Julian. This court disagreed, finding that the Tulsa ordinance's definition of "owner" applied to Marshall because she was responsible for Julian's care and maintenance at the time. This does not conflict with state law, as state law contemplates a dog having more than one owner. With regard to Marshall's common law negligence claim, the Court found that the City did not owe Marshall a duty because she was not a foreseeable plaintiff. Merely residing in city limits does not automatically make her a foreseeable plaintiff nor did the City's failure to perform a formal behavior evaluation on Julian. In addition, Marshall was not a foreseeable plaintiff from the foster's placement of Julian with her. In fact, the foster's placement of Julian with Marshall violated the Foster Agreement. The trial court's granting of summary judgment and denial of Marshall's motion for partial summary judgement was affirmed.

Summary: This 2023 Kentucky law states that a microbrewery licensed as provided in K.S.A. 41-308b may allow live dogs in outside and inside areas on the premises if the conditions specified in subsection (c) are met. In addition, a food establishment, as defined in K.S.A. 65-656, that is not a microbrewery may allow live dogs in outside areas on the premises, if the conditions as specified in subsection (c) are met.

Summary: Companion animals are part of today's American family. As family members, people spend time and resources to ensure their nonhuman family members are healthy and happy. This emotional connection is increasingly being recognized and has started to permeate some areas of the law. Yet, when a companion animal is killed or injured, they continue to be valued economically by the legal system. Fair Market value is the predominant approach in damages compensation when companion animals are injured or killed. Ironically, there is nothing fair about this approach. There is a social interest in companion animals' health and well-being based on the emotional bond shared with them. Sadly, after six decades, this area remains underdeveloped. Current damages available when a companion animal has been harmed cost owners their mental health and tranquility, while tortfeasors get away with the harm caused. There is an imbalance that ought to be recalibrated. Should companion animal owners be compensated for their emotional injuries when their companion animals are injured or killed? That question has been answered numerous times before. They should, indeed. This article answers a different question: how and to what extent should noneconomic damages be awarded in companion animal cases? Suggestions to expand existing causes of action, allowing noneconomic damages for trespass to chattel, and taking animals outside the property classification have been proposed. This article presents a novel legal framework that focuses on the status of companion animals within their family. Still, it is based on public policy and existing legal doctrine that is adapted to the unique situation of animals: beloved integral members of the family unit that are categorized as property by the legal system.

Summary: This Delaware law on disposition of marital property with divorce was amended in 2023 to address the needs of companion animals owned during marriage. Per susbsection (g)(1), if a court finds a companion animal is marital property, the court shall take into considering the "well-being of the companion animal." In doing so, the court may consider factors like the ability of each party to support and care for the companion animal, the attachment between the animal and the person, and the time and effort spent with the animal during marriage. If the parties are awarded a shared interest in the companion animal, then future disposition to limited to those situations mentioned in the law.