United States

Summary: State v. Mercedes addresses the constitutionality of a warrantless search under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, which protects against unlawful invasions of privacy. The defendant, Mary Mercedes, challenged the validity of consent given to animal control officers to search her property, where evidence of animal cruelty was discovered. The trial court suppressed the evidence, ruling that Ferrier warnings—requiring officers to inform individuals of their right to refuse, limit, or revoke consent—were necessary. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Ferrier warnings apply only to searches of a person’s home, not outdoor property. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the officers’ investigative purpose—responding to animal cruelty complaints and monitoring compliance—did not trigger Ferrier requirements. The court emphasized that Ferrier applies narrowly to warrantless searches of homes for contraband or evidence of a crime, not to outdoor property inspections for regulatory or investigative purposes. The case was remanded to determine whether consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.

Summary: The list in this section contains the names of all species of wildlife which have been determined by the Services to be Endangered or Threatened. It also contains the names of species of wildlife treated as Endangered or Threatened because they are sufficiently similar in appearance to Endangered or Threatened species.

Summary: This chapter comprises the Indiana Center for Animal Policy. The state veterinarian is the chief administrative officer of the center. The center is directed to protect human and animal health and ensure efficient delivery of animal health services and products of animal origin in Indiana.

Summary: This Massachusetts statute makes it a crime to enter any premises in which animals are being housed or used in research by a research institution and, without authority, cause damage and/or trespass.

Summary: This Pennsylvania law entitled the Pennsylvania's Protection from Abuse (PFA) Act was amended in 2024, effective in 2025. Under new subsection (a)(9.1), an order or agreement of protection may include, "[g]ranting temporary ownership rights over a companion animal and directing the defendant to refrain from possessing, contacting, attempting to contact, transferring or relocating the companion animal or contacting or entering the property of any person sheltering the companion animal."

Summary: This Illinois chapter enacted in 2023 is known as the Protection of Dogs and Cats from Unnecessary Testing Act. Under the act, a testing facility shall not conduct a canine or feline toxicological experiment in this State unless the experiment is conducted for any of the following purposes: medical research, to comply with approval of a medical device, or to approve a drug or biologic under certain listed federal laws. The Attorney General or a State's Attorney in the county in which a violation of this Act occurred may bring an action in the name of the People of the State to enforce the provisions of this Act.

Summary: This Colorado case involves the appeal of the dismissal of a habeas corpus proceeding. The appeal asked the Colorado Supreme Court to decide whether the liberty interests protected by the "great writ of habeas corpus" extend to nonhuman animals. Petitioner Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (“NRP”) contends that the district court erred in dismissing its habeas petition because the five elephants that are the subject of the petition, Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo (“the elephants”), lacked standing to seek relief via the great writ. These elderly elephants live at the Cheyenne Mountain Zoo (“CMZ”) and where NRP asserts they were unlawfully confined. In support of this contention, NRP submitted affidavits from several animal biologists who stated that these intelligent and complex creatures are suffering from psychological disorders and stress from being in captivity. The Zoo countered with a motion to dismiss, arguing the elephants received extraordinary care and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because the elephants do not have standing to seek habeas relief. After the district court granted the motion to dismiss, this court sought to determine whether habeas corpus relief extends to nonhuman animals. The court first looked at Colorado's statutory grant of authority for habeas relief. In doing so, the court found that the statute grants "any person" the ability to seek habeas relief from illegal confinement or restraint of liberty. While "person" is not defined in the law, the court found other statutory definitions that limit "person" to mean "human being." This definition is bolstered by the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "person." Since Colorado's law explicitly limits habeas corpus relief to "persons," the court was unpersuaded by NRP to expand the writ to animals based on common law interpretations. Further, the court noted that even if the statute did not say "person," it would still not be persuaded to expand the writ because no other jurisdiction has recognized "personhood" for nonhuman species, expansion would have "unintended consequences" for interactions between humans and animals, and there is no evidence the Colorado legislature ever intended to recognize animals as legal persons in the statute. This court affirmed the district court's finding that Colorado's writ of habeas corpus does not apply to nonhuman animals.

Summary: This case involves a challenge by The Art and Antique Dealers League of America, Inc. and The National Antique and Art Dealers Association of America, Inc. (collectively, "Plaintiffs") against New York State's Environmental Conservation Law § 11-0535-a (the "State Ivory Law"), which restricts the sale and display of ivory articles. Plaintiffs argued that the State Ivory Law is preempted by the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) and violates their First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the preemption claim and granted summary judgment to the State on the First Amendment claim. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the preemption claim but reversed the grant of summary judgment on the First Amendment claim, holding that the State's "Display Restriction" on ivory items was more extensive than necessary to serve the State's interest in preventing illegal ivory sales. The court directed the entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, barring enforcement of the Display Restriction against Plaintiffs' members. Judge Sullivan dissented, arguing that the ESA preempts the State Ivory Law, rendering the First Amendment issue moot. The court relied on the State's concession that the Display Restriction implicates commercial speech but declined to establish a precedent on whether such displays constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.

Summary: The plaintiffs, including retail pet stores and a USDA-licensed breeder, challenged Maryland's 2021 Pet Store Statute, which prohibits retail pet stores from selling or transferring dogs and cats, alleging it conflicts with the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and violates the Commerce Clause. The Pet Store Statute aims to curb the sale of dogs from "puppy mills" by banning retail pet stores and brokers from selling dogs, while exempting breeders who sell animals born at their establishments. Plaintiffs argued that the statute effectively shifts dog sales from regulated retail pet stores sourcing from out-of-state breeders to unregulated internet sales and local breeders, undermining the AWA's regulatory framework. The AWA establishes federal standards for the humane treatment of animals, including licensing requirements for breeders and brokers, but explicitly allows states to enact additional animal welfare regulations. The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the AWA preempts the Pet Store Statute, finding no conflict because the AWA does not occupy the field of animal welfare regulation and permits concurrent state laws. Plaintiffs also argued that the statute obstructs the AWA's objectives by eliminating USDA-licensed brokers from the Maryland market, but the court found no evidence that the statute impedes federal licensing or inspection processes. The court dismissed plaintiffs' Commerce Clause claims, finding no discriminatory purpose or effect against out-of-state breeders, as the statute applies equally to in-state and out-of-state entities and does not prohibit interstate sales. The statute allows out-of-state breeders to sell directly to Maryland consumers, either in person or online, and does not regulate sales occurring wholly outside Maryland. The court upheld the statute's legitimacy, recognizing Maryland's interest in addressing puppy mills, protecting consumers from unhealthy animals, and reducing shelter populations, which are valid state police powers. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, concluding that the Pet Store Statute is not preempted by the AWA and does not violate the Commerce Clause, as it regulates animal welfare within Maryland's traditional authority. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Summary: In this North Carolina case, Defendant Jeffrey Lee Johnson appeals from judgments entered upon guilty verdicts of one count of felony cruelty to animals and two counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals. The conviction stems from a search of defendant's property after a phone call was made to animal control about a strong smell was coming from the property. After failing to reach the defendant by phone, animal control officers drove to the property and observed a "very, very strong odor" of ammonia, feces, and "the smell of rot." As the officers walked up the driveway, they encountered a chained dog ("Chubby") who presented with an irritated neck, worn down teeth, overgrown nails, and multiple scabs. Other dogs were observed without access to water, including a box filled with puppies and dried feces. This prompted the officers to check on the other dogs in the backyard. One dog was breathing shallowly and appeared at first to be deceased. After sending photos of the dogs to the magistrate, probable cause was found to charge the defendant with animal cruelty and impound the dogs for their safety. In total, 21 dogs were seized, two of which had to be euthanized. At trial, the court denied defendant's motion to suppress, and defendant was ultimately convicted at trial. On Appeal, defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred by concluding that a warrantless search of his home's curtilage was reasonable due to exigent circumstances and by denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of that search and the search of his home. This court found that there was no unreasonable search since it occurred while officers were walking up the driveway and "in a place where the public is allowed to be." The seizure of the dog Chubby was justified under the plain view doctrine. In addition, the officers held a reasonable belief that the other dogs observed on the property needed immediate aid to prevent further suffering. Thus, exigent circumstances existed supporting the seizure of the other dogs. Finally, after the plain view discoveries, there was a substantial basis for probable cause to search the property and its buildings that supported the search warrant that was eventually granted. The dogs were present and would have fallen under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, this court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress.