United States

Summary: In 2024, Rhode Island revised its divorce and separation chapter to include a provision for disposition of a companion animal during divorce. This new law allows a court to consider the "best interest" of the animal and provides factors to determine sole possession of the animal. These factors include, but are not limited to, who first owned the animal, who assumes most responsibility for care of the animal, which living arrangements are in the best interests of the animal, and whether children are involved in the care of the animal. In addition, the statute uniquely has provisions for awarding joint possession of the companion animal.

Summary: The Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) sued the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the USDA violated the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by approving the labels for Perdue's “Fresh Line” chicken and turkey products. Specifically, ALDF claims that the USDA adopted a policy of evaluating only the text and not any graphics that appear on poultry-product labels. Fresh Line chickens and turkeys were raised strictly indoors and the approved product labels depict birds freely roaming outside a barn. ALDF asked the Department to reject any Perdue labels containing that kind of imagery because they claim the imagery misleads consumers into thinking the birds were raised in pastures, when they in fact spent the entirety of their lives in overcrowded warehouses. The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has been delegated to enforce the PPIA labeling requirements and rejected ALDF's request to reject Fresh Line's "misleading" labels. After denial, the ALDF sued the USDA and FSIS, alleging the Fresh Line labels violated the PPIA and APA and that FSIS has a "pattern and practice" of not reviewing such graphical imagery on poultry-label products. The government moved to dismiss both claims and the district court agreed, finding ALDF lacks both organizational and associational standing. On appeal here of only associational standing, this court found that the member who was harmed cannot show a substantial likelihood that the member will suffer non-self-imposed harm in the future. In other words, the court was not convinced that the consumer member will continue to purchase the product in the future now that she knows the label is misleading. As to ALDF's claim that FSIS' policy of not reviewing imagery on poultry labels also harms the member because it causes a "lack of confidence" in any chicken labels, the court found that injury was sufficiently concrete. However, the member did not have an ongoing or imminent injury because there was no proof presented that there were other products that exist or will exist with this labeling issue. The district court's dismissal was affirmed.

Summary: This Minnesota Supreme Court case considers whether sovereign immunity shields the State Patrol from liability after a police canine injured a person in an unprovoked attack. This case stems from an incident that occurred in 2019, where a state trooper brought his patrol vehicle in for service at a car dealership accompanied by his State Patrol canine. During the visit, the canine committed an unprovoked attack on Berrier, who suffered serious and permanent injuries. Berrier sued the State Patrol, claiming her injuries were "a direct and proximate result" of the State Patrol's negligence. After some procedural issues, the district court denied the State Patrol's motion to dismiss, finding that Berrier sufficiently pleaded her claim under the state's strict liability dog-bite statute. In doing so, the court observed that the law imposes strict liability on "the owner" of a dog with a "clear intent to include governmental entities . . ." The court of appeals reversed the district court's order and remanded the case. Berrier then petitioned this court for review. On appeal here, the State Patrol questions whether Berrier adequately pleaded her dog-bite claim and whether the State Patrol has sovereign immunity even not when expressly referenced. The Supreme Court first noted there is a rigorous standard in Minnesota for waiving sovereign immunity where the statute as a whole must be read and interpreted. Previous caselaw held that the dog-bite statute applies to municipal owners of police dogs but did not touch on State actors. However, the court noted that the legislature could have amended the dog-bite law to exclude police dogs after that 2005 case, but did not do so. Further, the language of the dog-bite statute is broadly inclusive and has previously been interpreted broadly to effect the goals of the law (e.g., ensuring a claimant's full recovery). The Court was not swayed by the State's concerns of exposure to wide-ranging liability since only three agencies have active canine programs with few canines actually trained in apprehension or tracking of suspects. The court of appeals decision was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Summary: In this Vermont case, the defendant appealed a criminal division order granting the State's motion for civil forfeiture of his dog "Chad" based on a finding that he subjected the dog to cruelty. The first incident occurred in April 2022, where the defendant left Chad, a Siberian husky, locked in his vehicle on an "unseasonably warm" day where temperatures were in the high nineties. Two subsequent incidents occurred in the following months, culminating in defendant's arrest and a requirement that defendant surrender his dog. On appeal, defendant argues that the criminal division lacked jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding since Chad was not seized under 13 V.S.A. § 354, that the State failed to prove animal cruelty by clear and convincing evidence under 13 V.S.A. § 352. Defendant also argued that the criminal division erred in admitting lay witness testimony (the police officer) regarding the internal temperature of defendant's car under Vermont Rule of Evidence 701. The Supreme Court found that the dog owner's challenge to the dog's seizure was not an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. Since defendant conceded it was not raised below, the court held that it could not be raised for the first time on appeal. As to defendant's next argument that there was insufficient evidence, this court found clear and convincing evidence that established animal cruelty to warrant forfeiture, including the fact Chad had no access to water, the outside temperature was high, and the officer observed early stages of heat exhaustion in the dog. Finally, even if admitting the lay testimony of the officer as to internal car temperature was error, it "falls within the purview of harmless error" since the record provided an unchallenged temperature reading for that day and the officer observed closed windows and distress from the dog. The case was affirmed.

Summary: Under this 2023 Arizona law, each ambulance service shall require its emergency medical care technicians and ambulance attendants to transport a police dog that is injured in the line of duty, along with a trained police officer by a ground ambulance or another emergency medical services vehicle to a veterinary clinic or veterinary hospital equipped to provide emergency treatment to dogs. This is only allowed if all criteria listed in the law are met, including the fact that a person is not requiring emergency medical treatment or transport by the ambulance.

Summary: In 2021, Maine amended its divorce laws to allow a judge to consider other factors in awarding ownership of companion animals to one party. These factors include things like (1) the well-being and basic daily needs of the companion animal; (2) the amount of time each party has spent with the companion animal during the marriage tending to the companion animal; the ability of a party to continue to own, support and provide adequate care for the companion animal; (3) the emotional attachment of a party to the companion animal; (4) the emotional attachment of any child in the household to the companion animal and the benefit to the child of the companion animal's remaining in the primary residence of the child; (5) any domestic violence between the parties or in the household of the parties; and (6) any history of animal abuse or other unsafe conditions for the companion animal.

Summary: In 2021, New York amended the domestic relations law requiring the court to consider the best interest of a companion animal when awarding possession in a divorce or separation proceeding. New subsection (5)(d)(15) states, "in awarding the possession of a companion animal, the court shall consider the best interest of such animal. “Companion animal”, as used in this subparagraph, shall have the same meaning as in subdivision five of section three hundred fifty of the agriculture and markets law."

Summary: In 2019, Plaintiff was bitten by a dog while at a facility operated by Brandywine Valley SPCA (“BVSPCA”), a non-profit animal welfare organization that takes in stray or surrendered animals and offers some of those animals for adoption. The bite occurred at the BVSPCA facility where a large dog named "Ceelo" was housed. Ceelo had previously lunged at a veterinarian during intake and vaccination. Plaintiff Riad was bitten on the hand while waiting to adopt Ceelo, who was on a leash held by a BVSPCA employee. After the incident, Ceelo was eventually euthanized due to a "noticeable decline in behavior." In 2021, Riad filed a personal injury complaint in Superior Court based on: (1) 16 Del. C. § 3053F, the dog bite strict liability statute; and (2) negligence. The Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of the organization and the plaintiff appealed. The primary question on appeal is whether an animal welfare organization is exempt from strict liability under the statute. The lower court held that the statute does not apply to such organizations based on two previous Superior Court opinions that concluded the legislature's intent when enacting the statute was “to rein in irresponsible dog owners who were keeping vicious dogs as pets by eliminating the ‘one free bite rule.'" Here, the Delaware Supreme Court found that reliance misguided as the statutory text contains only limited exceptions and a clear definition of the word "owner." The Court found that it "inappropriate for the Superior Court to engage in a speculative inquiry into the General Assembly's intentions at the time of the dog bite statute's enactment." The Court was not persuaded by BVSPCA's suggestion that the separation of definitions for "animal shelter" and "owner" implied that the term owner does not include animal shelter. The plain language of the statute does not exempt an animal welfare organization from the definition for owner. In addition, BVSPCA's argument that this interpretation disfavors public policy was also rejected by the Court since the statute is unambiguous. Finally, the Court held that, contrary to BVSPCA's assertions, expert witness testimony was not required by law to establish the degree of care a reasonably prudent person must exercise in controlling an aggressive dog. The Superior Court's entry of summary judgment was reversed.

Summary: Scott Johnson and Harlene Hoyt, the plaintiffs, challenge the constitutionality of the Kansas Pet Animal Act (the Act), which authorizes warrantless inspections of their homestead, where Mr. Johnson operates a business housing and training bird dogs. They argue that the Act violates the Fourth Amendment by permitting warrantless inspections and infringes on their constitutional right to travel by requiring premises to be made available for inspection within 30 minutes of an inspector’s arrival. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted the state’s motion to dismiss, prompting the plaintiffs to appeal. The court analyzed the Act, noting that it imposes varying inspection requirements and housing standards on different licensees, with all licensees subject to initial and routine inspections “at reasonable times.” Refusal to permit inspections constitutes grounds for license suspension or revocation. The court then examined whether the Act violates the Fourth Amendment, applying precedent from Burger and subsequent cases. It identified relevant factors for determining whether an industry is closely regulated, including the history of warrantless inspections, the extensiveness of the regulatory scheme, whether similar schemes exist in other jurisdictions, and the potential threat to public welfare if left unregulated. The parties disputed whether Mr. Johnson’s business qualifies as part of a closely regulated industry. The court credited the plaintiffs’ allegation that training kennels are distinct from other animal-related operations, noting that Kansas treats them as a separate category requiring specific licenses. The court concluded that the boarding or training-kennel industry does not qualify as closely regulated under the Fourth Amendment’s narrow exception for warrantless inspections. It emphasized the industry’s lack of a long tradition of regulation and found that the regulatory scheme does not clearly inform industry participants of unannounced warrantless inspections. Applying Patel, the court held that the regulatory scheme must satisfy three criteria for warrantless searches to be reasonable: a substantial government interest, necessity of warrantless inspections to further the regulatory scheme, and a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. The court found that dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim was improper, as the complaint did not establish that the closely regulated industry exception applies or that the Burger factors were satisfied. It also reversed the dismissal of the claim that the Act unconstitutionally conditions licensure on waiving Fourth Amendment rights. However, the court affirmed that the 30-minute inspection availability requirement does not violate the constitutional right to travel. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Summary: This New York case concerns a challenge to the New York City Local Law No. 2019/202 that prohibits restaurants and retail food establishments within the City of New York from selling or serving foie gras and other force-fed products. Petitioner City of New York challenges the final determination of respondents Richard A. Ball, as Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets, and the Department of Agriculture and Markets, which found that Local Law 202 unreasonably restricts and regulates farming operations within the agricultural districts where foie gras is produced, contrary to Agriculture and Markets Law (“AML”) § 305-a. The City argued that Local Law 202 does not impact AML § 305-a because it does not have a direct impact on the farms that produce the foie gras in the agricultural district in the county where it is produced. According to the City, Local Law 202 merely prohibits restaurants and food establishments within the City from selling force-fed products, and the Farms remain free to continue producing foie gras in agricultural districts through force-feeding. In looking at the statute text, this court found that a restriction on processes used within farm operations of agricultural districts fits within the purview of the statute. While New York has adopted broad home-rule powers, their scope is limited to regulation in the territorial boundaries. The testimony and legislative history of Local Law 202 demonstrates that the goal of the law was animal welfare as opposed to human health or safety; these practices are reasonably tied to farming practices in outside agricultural districts. Thus, the measure falls within the scope of AML § 305-a as a “local law” that “restrict[s] or regulate[s] farm operations in agricultural districts." While the City has a legitimate desire to protect animals from a cruel practice, it cannot do so in a manner that is inconsistent with state law. The court noted that the state legislature is free to "recalibrate" the statutory construction of AML § 305-a to allow animal welfare concerns, but, in its current form, that would be inconsistent with the language. The motions of intervenors were dismissed, the Petition was denied in all respects, and the proceeding was dismissed.