Pigs

Summary: In Triumph Foods, LLC v. Rob Bonta et al., No. 2:25-cv-09063-CAS-AJR (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2026), the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted defendants' and intervenors' motions to dismiss plaintiff's constitutional challenge to California Health & Safety Code § 25990 et seq., commonly known as Proposition 12. Proposition 12 prohibits the sale within California of whole pork meat from breeding pigs confined in a "cruel manner," which the statute defines as confinement that prevents the animal from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely, or that provides less than 24 square feet of usable floorspace per pig. The court held that plaintiff's express and implied preemption claims under the Federal Meat Inspection Act failed as a matter of law because Proposition 12 regulates farm animal confinement standards to prevent animal cruelty rather than slaughterhouse operations, placing it outside the FMIA's preemptive scope. The court further dismissed plaintiff's dormant Commerce Clause claims, finding that the statute is facially nondiscriminatory and that plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that its "slaughterhouse exception" imposes a significant burden on interstate commerce. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process vagueness challenge was rejected on grounds that the statutory definitions provide sufficient clarity for persons of ordinary intelligence to understand prohibited conduct. The court also dismissed plaintiff's Import-Export Clause claim as foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent limiting that clause to foreign commerce. The dismissals were with prejudice as to the preemption and Import-Export Clause claims, and without prejudice as to the Commerce Clause and due process claims, with leave to amend granted.

Summary: In this appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal and summary judgment rulings upholding the Massachusetts Act to Prevent Cruelty to Farm Animals against a multifaceted constitutional challenge by out-of-state pork producers. The court held that the Act's prohibition on the in-state sale of pork from gestation-crated pigs did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, as plaintiffs failed to adduce significantly probative evidence of either discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect, and the incidental burdens on interstate commerce were legally insufficient under the principles articulated in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross. The panel further rejected claims under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, noting its inapplicability to corporate entities, and found no preemption by either the Federal Meat Inspection Act or the Packers and Stockyards Act, as the Massachusetts law regulates upstream production and sales, not federally occupied fields of inspection or packer discrimination. Additional challenges under the Full Faith and Credit, Due Process, and Import-Export Clauses were similarly unavailing, with the court concluding the Act was not impermissibly vague, did not constitute a policy of hostility toward other states' right-to-farm laws, and concerned only interstate, not foreign, commerce. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the entry of judgment in favor of the Commonwealth.

Summary: The case concerns a legal dispute between the plaintiff and the District Municipality of San Ramón over the plaintiff's right to keep her pet pig, Petunia, at her dwelling. The plaintiff filed an Amparo petition to invalidate four administrative resolutions and dismiss an administrative sanctioning procedure that ordered Petunia's removal. She argued that the resolutions violated her rights to due process, personal development, and privacy, emphasizing the emotional bond with Petunia and Petunia's welfare rights. The lower court denied the Amparo, suggesting administrative procedures as the proper recourse. However, on March 16, 2022, the Juzgado Civil de La Merced granted the petition, invalidated the resolutions, and allowed the plaintiff to keep Petunia under good sanitary conditions.

Summary: Este caso gira en torno a una disputa legal entre la demandante y el Municipio del Distrito de San Ramón, en Perú, respecto al derecho de la demandante de tener a su cerda "Petunia" como mascota. La demandante presentó un derecho de Amparo buscando la nulidad de cuatro resoluciones administrativas acerca de la tenencia de mascotas. Además, la demandante solicitó el archivo del procedimiento sancionador administrativo iniciado en su contra basado en la infracción de dichas resoluciones y que ordenaba la reubicación de Petunia fuera de la ciudad. Por último, la demandante solicitó autorización para tener a Petunia en su hogar en buenas condiciones de higiene. La demandante alegó una violación de sus derechos al debido proceso, al libre desarrollo de la personalidad y a la privacidad personal y familiar, ya que las resoluciones y el procedimiento sancionador iniciado posteriormente no le permitían a ella y a su familia tener a Petunia con ellos, quien era considerada parte de la familia y con quien la demandante y sus hijos tenían un vínculo emocional fuerte. Además, la demandante argumentó que el derecho al bienestar de Petunia también estaba siendo violado. El tribunal de primera instancia negó el Amparo bajo el argumento de que dicha petición no estaba disponible por cuanto el procedimiento administrativo era el mecanismo adecuado en este caso. La demandante agotó todas las instancias procesales y el 16 de marzo de 2022, mediante la Resolución 13, el Juzgado Civil de La Merced concedió la petición, anulando las resoluciones administrativas y ordenando el archivo del procedimiento administrativo sancionado iniciado en contra de la demandante. Además, el juez le permitió a la demandante continuar con la tenencia de Petunia bajo buenas condiciones de higiene.

Summary: This case was brought by plaintiffs, several nonprofit animal rights organizations, to challenge a Final Rule implementing a new swine inspection system at pig farms and slaughterhouses across the United States against defendants, the United States Department of Agriculture and the Food Safety Inspection Service. The new system requires that employees of the slaughterhouses perform ante-mortem and post-mortem sorting activities before the federal inspection is to take place, which plaintiffs challenge under the argument that this shifting of the sorting activities to slaughterhouse employees is in violation of the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA). Plaintiffs argue that this delegation is improper, would negatively impact the safety of pork being produced by slaughterhouses, and would lead to inhumane slaughter of pigs. Plaintiffs and defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the delegation of the sorting process was improper.

Summary: This case is brought by a farm in the business of raising and breeding pigs. Plaintiff brought suit against a veterinarian and veterinary clinic for several claims, including malpractice. Plaintiff alleges defendant failed to oversee and perform testing for Mhp, leading plaintiff to unknowingly transfer infected pigs to other farms resulting in monetary damages. Defendants moved for summary judgment and were denied, with the court holding that the two year statute of limitations for veterinary malpractice claims does not apply, and the five year statute of limitations for unwritten contract applies.

Summary: This Oregon law makes the restrictive confinement of a pregnant pig illegal in the state to phase out the use of gestation crates in the Oregon farming industry. The law makes it illegal to confine a pregnant pig in a way that prevents them from lying down and fully extending their limbs or turning around freely. There are some exceptions to this law, such as for transportation, veterinary care, or during the slaughtering process.

Summary: The Iowa Pork Producers Association, an organization that represents Iowa-based industrial pig farmers, filed a lawsuit in federal district court alleging that California’s Proposition 12 is unconstitutional. Proposition 12, a ballot measure that California voters passed in 2018, mandates that pregnant pigs must be housed with a certain amount of space in order for products made from such livestock to be sold in California. Proposition 12 also bans the sale of pork meat from producers that do not comply with the housing requirements, including sales from out of state producers. Plaintiff contended that Proposition 12 violates the dormant commerce clause in that it discriminates against interstate commerce, directly regulates extraterritorial conduct, and that even if it regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. The court looked to the purpose of Proposition 12, which is intended to prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm animal confinement, which also threaten the health and safety of California consumers, and increase the risk of foodborne illness and associated negative fiscal impacts on the state of California. The court found that this purpose is not discriminatory, and that there is no hint of economic protectionism. The court also found that there is no discriminatory effect, as the statute treats all producers the same by imposing the same requirements. The court also denied the extraterritoriality claim because Proposition 12 is not a price control or price affirmation statute and, therefore, does not directly regulate extraterritorial economic conduct. The court also found that the burden imposed on commerce was not clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. The court’s precedent states that even if producers will need to adopt a more costly method of production to comply with Proposition 12, such increased costs do not constitute a substantial burden on interstate commerce, and higher costs to consumers do not qualify as a substantial burden on interstate commerce. The district court dismissed the case, holding that plaintiffs failed to raise serious questions as to the merits of the claims.

Summary: This collection of laws was created by Massachusetts voters when they approved Question 3 and the 2016 ballot. These laws prevent the inhumane confinement of pregnant pigs, calves raised for veal, and egg-laying hens in the state of Massachusetts. These laws also prohibit the sale of products in Massachusetts made from animals confined in violation of these laws.

Summary: Following the adoption of California’s Proposition 12, two organizations – the National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (Petitioners) – filed this lawsuit on behalf of the members of these organizations that are in the business of raising and processing pigs for the sale of pork meat. Petitioners allege that Proposition 12, which forbids the sale of whole pork meat in California that is made from breeding pigs (or their immediate offspring) that are confined in a cruel manner, violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by placing an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Under Proposition 12, confinement of pigs is cruel if it prevents a pig from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely. Petitioners allege that the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will increase production costs, but concede that those costs will fall on both California and out-of-state pork producers. Petitioners also allege that, because California imports most of the pork it consumes, the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will be dealt to mostly out-of-state producers. The district court concluded that petitioners’ complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law and dismissed the case, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, rejecting petitioners’ arguments that Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court found no violation of the dormant Commerce Clause because: (1) petitioners concede that Proposition 12 did not implicate the antidiscrimination principle, because it imposes the same burdens on in-state pork producers that it imposes on out-of-state pork producers, and (2) petitioners’ reliance on the Pike line of cases to prevent a state from regulating the sale of a consumer good within its borders on nondiscriminatory terms was rejected, as that line of cases had never yielded such a result. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was affirmed.