Dogs

Summary: Law 27596 establishes regulations regarding the breeding, training, commercialization, possession, and transfer of potentially dangerous dogs for the purpose of protecting people's integrity, health, and tranquility. The law prohibits encouraging any form of canine aggression and makes special reference to dog fighting. In general, owners of potentially dangerous dogs must be competent and physically capable of caring for the dog, including providing them with appropriate training. In the event of a stray, the dog must be taken in by the municipality whose jurisdiction it is within and reinserted into the community through animal care programs, so long as it is not deemed aggressive. The law also describes the procedure for how to handle a dog that attacks another living being or kills an animal, and the corresponding consequences of such events. Lastly, the law states regulations for handling dogs with grave diseases that could be transmitted to human beings.

Summary: Esta ley, aprobada en junio de 2023, describe una modificación a la ley 30407 para incluir normas relativas a la adopción de mascotas abandonadas y entregadas, o animales adoptados para ser de compañía. El objeto de esta modificación es ampliar la protección de los animales de compañía y garantizar su bienestar.

Summary: This law amends Law 30407, Animal Protection and Welfare Law, to incorporate the adoption and identification of companion animals.

Summary: En este caso, la demandante presentó esta demanda alegando daño contra el patrimonio y actos de crueldad. La demandante asistió a una reunión social con sus hijos y dejó a sus dos perros Kira y Logan, jugando fuera. La demandante regresó a su casa y descubrió que su vecino, el demandado, había cometido un acto de zoofilia contra Kira. El tribunal examinó varias cuestiones constitucionales y teorías de la pena. Sopesó los factores de lo que el demandado había hecho a Kira con su falta de antecedentes y su escasa probabilidad de reincidencia. El tribunal decidió que el demandado debía cumplir 17 meses de encarcelamiento y pagar multas civiles por el sufrimiento tanto de la demandante como de Kira. También se basó en la cuestión del bienestar de los animales su decisión de prohibir al demandado la "tenencia" de animales para reducir aún más el riesgo de reincidencia. En definitiva, el tribunal basó sus decisiones en motivos de bienestar animal y condena de la crueldad hacia los animales.

Summary: The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant, arguing the defendant committed a crime against his patrimony and cruel acts against animals under the criminal code. The plaintiff attended a social gathering with her children and left their two dogs, Kira and Logan, playing outside. The plaintiff returned to their home to find that their neighbor, the defendant, had committed an act of bestiality against Kira. The court discussed several constitutional questions and theories of punishment. It weighed the factors of what the defendant had done to Kira with his lack of prior record and low chance of recidivism. The court decided that the defendant was to serve 17 months of incarceration and was required to pay civil fines for the suffering of both the plaintiff and Kira. Rooted in the issue of animal welfare, too, was its holding in prohibiting the defendant from “keeping” animals to further reduce the risk of recidivism. Ultimately, the court based its decisions on grounds of animal welfare and condemnation of cruelty towards animals.

Summary: Appellant Stefanowicz appeals from the judgment entered in the Tioga County Court of Common Pleas in Pennsylvania. Appellant and his wife co-owned a deer farm ("Awesome Whitetails") where they are legally licensed to operate and sell trophy bucks which are kept in a fenced-in enclosure on their property. Appellant's neighbor, Ms. Smith, owned two German Shepherd dogs, which Appellant testified frequently entered his property and had previously harassed the animals he raises there. Appellant and his wife submitted a complaint to the state dog warden who then warned Smith of the statewide requirements on confining dogs. The warden also advised Appellant of the legal right to kill a dog that is “in the act of pursuing or wounding or killing” Appellant's animals. In fall of 2020, Smith's dogs entered Appellant's property and were chasing the deer from outside the fence. This deer began to panic, causing one to get stuck in the fence where one of the dogs then stared biting it. Appellant tried to yell at the dogs to no avail, so he then shot and killed the dogs. Appellant testified that one deer had a bloody gash, two more had bloody faces, and one deer died of a broken neck. Ultimately, Smith was sent a citation for failing to confine the dogs and Appellant was charged with two counts of Aggravated Cruelty to Animals and convicted of one of those counts. On appeal, Appellant raises several issues. The first two issues challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for the Aggravated Cruelty conviction. The court found sufficient evidence for the conviction as Appellant acted in an intentional manner to kill the dogs. Next, Appellant asserts that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because of his legal defense. In Pennsylvania, it is legal to kill certain dogs in the act of pursuing or wounding "domestic animals" (which includes farm-raised deer). The trial judge here gave an instruction on the defense, but added that "under the laws of this Commonwealth, harassing an animal through a fence without any contact does not constitute pursuing, wounding, or killing an animal." Here, the jury heard that instruction and found the defense inapplicable for one dog. There was testimony from Appellant that he saw one of the two dogs biting a deer caught in the fence, not both dogs. Since the jury was free to evaluate the testimony and infer guilt, the reviewing court will not disturb the lower court's determination. After disposing of the remaining issues related to jury selection and ineffective assistance of counsel, the court affirmed Appellant's sentence.

Summary: In this North Carolina case, the defendant appeals from his conviction of felony cruelty to animals and suspended sentence of imprisonment. The conviction stems from Defendant's kicking of his neighbor's dog. According to testimony of the dog's owner, Defendant would activate sprinklers in his yard anytime someone with a dog walked by his home. In November of 2019, the dog's owner was walking her fourteen-year-old dachshund-beagle mix, Davis, in front of Defendant's house when she stepped out of the roadway onto Defendant's lawn to avoid a passing car. The occupants of the car then stopped to talk with the dog's owner briefly, whereupon Defendant emerged from his home and proceeded to kick Davis in the stomach. The dog's owner called the police and the dog was transported to an emergency veterinarian because he was "lifeless" and "limp." Defendant was ultimately charged, indicted, and convicted of felonious cruelty to animals. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charge of felonious cruelty to animals because a single kick was insufficient to show that Defendant "cruelly beat" the dog; and (2) that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor cruelty to animals. This court first addressed whether a single kick to a dog was sufficient to meet the definition of "cruelly beat." Looking first at the standard dictionary definition of "beat," the court found that the words, “cruelly beat” can apply to any act that causes the unjustifiable pain, suffering, or death to an animal, even if it is just one single act. In fact, the court stated, "[t]o hold otherwise would allow a person to kick a dog so hard they suffer life-threatening injuries—such as the case here—but not be subject to felonious cruelty to animals because it was 'just' one kick." Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. As to the lesser included offense instruction, this court found that there was no evidence of error, let alone plain error, since the jury would have likely found Defendant guilty of felonious animal cruelty based on the evidence presented. No reversible error occurred and Defendant's conviction was affirmed.

Summary: Plaintiffs filed this putative class action to challenge the Prince George's County, Maryland Pit Bull Ordinance and enforcement of the ordinance. Plaintiffs assert multiple due process and equal protection claims in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as several violations of the Fair Housing Act. The ordinance bans the keeping of pit bull terriers in the county, and requires any pit bull owners at the time the ordinance was adopted to register the dog, pay a fee, maintain a secure kennel, and keep the dog secure at all times. The court in this case found that the plaintiffs lack standing, since they could not show an injury in fact relating to the county's enforcement of the ordinance, the county has returned seized dogs to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs have been afforded due process through the county's administrative process.

Summary: This case is an appeal of the defendant's conviction on multiple counts of aggravated cruelty to animals, and abuse or neglect of animals. Defendant appeals the felony convictions of aggravated cruelty to animals, arguing that the animal's pain and suffering was caused by neglect rather than any intentional acts. The animals were seized from the defendant's home, where they were found to be lacking food, water, space, and sufficient veterinary care. A veterinarian testified that the animals were underweight, dehydrated, and many had wounds that were not properly treated. Defendant argues that this treatment constitutes abuse or neglect, and that is what the legislature intended to be punished as a misdemeanor. The court considered the use of the word "torture" under the statute, finding that as the actor's conduct is intentional, and results in pain and suffering to the animal, the definition applies. Here, the court finds that there was sufficient evidence that the actions were intentional and resulting in pain and suffering, so the defendant tortured the animals. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

Summary: This case is an appeal concerning an agreement to share possession of a dog between a couple that had ended their relationship. The lower court granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the court of appeals vacated the order, then this appeal followed. The parties purchased the dog together while they were still a couple, and agreed to share the dog if they broke up. After the relationship eventually ended, the couple shared the dog on a two week alternating basis. Eventually, one party maintained custody of the dog and denied the other party access to the dog, so plaintiff filed this action for conversion and breach of contract, seeking specific performance of the custody agreement for the dog. The court here found that the dog is jointly owned property, the lack of a written contract does not bar the plaintiff from specific performance, and that the judge's order of specific performance was a suitable remedy since monetary damages would not allow plaintiff access to his shared property. Therefore, the court reversed the order vacating the preliminary injunction and denied the defendant's petition for relief from the preliminary injunction.