New York

Summary: This landmark decision fundamentally reshapes New York's dog bite jurisprudence by overturning Bard v. Jahnke and reinstating negligence as a viable cause of action for injuries caused by domestic animals. The Court held that Bard's strict liability framework, which required proof of an owner's actual or constructive knowledge of a dog's vicious propensities, created an unfair exception to ordinary tort principles and had proven unworkable in practice. Recognizing that most jurisdictions permit negligence claims under Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 509 and 518, the Court established a dual-path system: plaintiffs may now pursue either strict liability (if vicious propensities are shown) or traditional negligence claims against animal owners. The decision also reversed summary judgment on plaintiff's strict liability claim, finding triable issues regarding whether defendants should have known of their dog's aggressive tendencies based on postal workers' affidavits describing the animal's repeated violent window-banging behavior. The Court's disposition reversed the Appellate Division's order and denied defendants' motion for summary judgment in its entirety, reinstating both causes of action.

Summary: This case involves plaintiffs seeking reimbursement for veterinary expenses after purchasing a Yorkshire Terrier puppy ("Bentley") that exhibited severe illness symptoms, including lethargy and repeated dark brown vomiting, just four days after purchase from defendant's pet store. The puppy was eventually diagnosed with Parvovirus at Cornell University Hospital for Animals, requiring intensive treatment. The central legal issues revolve around: (1) whether plaintiffs could recover under General Business Law § 753 (which they failed to satisfy due to lack of timely veterinary certification); (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability under UCC §§ 2-314 and 2-715 given the puppy's rapid deterioration and positive PCR test for Parvovirus; and (3) promissory estoppel claims regarding alleged reimbursement promises. The court found plaintiffs established by preponderance of evidence that Bentley was infected at time of sale, noting the puppy's excessive sleeping from day one and subsequent critical condition, while rejecting defendant's 3-4 day incubation period arguments as inconsistent with veterinary evidence showing 7-day symptom onset. While denying promissory estoppel claims for lack of detrimental reliance, the court awarded damages under UCC theories, emphasizing the highly contagious nature of Parvovirus and finding defendant's 48-hour return policy unconscionable under UCC § 2-719(3) as applied to defective goods. The court awarded plaintiffs judgment in the amount of $3,878.29 for veterinary expenses plus court costs against defendants Melissa Winslow and Melrose Pet Palace.

Summary: The Court of Appeals reversed Ulster County Court and reinstated Kingston City Court’s dismissal of the accusatory instrument against Christopher Farrell for violating AML § 353 (failure to provide necessary sustenance to an animal), holding the instrument facially insufficient. The investigator’s allegations, principally that Farrell’s dog suffered from untreated spondylosis, flea infestation, and masses, relied on hearsay and lacked nonhearsay facts linking the conditions to Farrell’s neglect, such as veterinary records or observable signs of suffering. While the prosecution argued that Farrell’s admission to never seeking veterinary care established culpability, the Court found this insufficient without evidence that the lack of care directly caused the dog’s decline. Without factual allegations demonstrating deprivation of sustenance, the instrument failed to meet jurisdictional pleading standards under CPL 100.40, mandating dismissal. The Court declined to resolve whether "sustenance" includes veterinary care, as the pleading deficiencies were dispositive.

Summary: This case involves a challenge by The Art and Antique Dealers League of America, Inc. and The National Antique and Art Dealers Association of America, Inc. (collectively, "Plaintiffs") against New York State's Environmental Conservation Law § 11-0535-a (the "State Ivory Law"), which restricts the sale and display of ivory articles. Plaintiffs argued that the State Ivory Law is preempted by the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) and violates their First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the preemption claim and granted summary judgment to the State on the First Amendment claim. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the preemption claim but reversed the grant of summary judgment on the First Amendment claim, holding that the State's "Display Restriction" on ivory items was more extensive than necessary to serve the State's interest in preventing illegal ivory sales. The court directed the entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, barring enforcement of the Display Restriction against Plaintiffs' members. Judge Sullivan dissented, arguing that the ESA preempts the State Ivory Law, rendering the First Amendment issue moot. The court relied on the State's concession that the Display Restriction implicates commercial speech but declined to establish a precedent on whether such displays constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.

Summary: In 2021, New York amended the domestic relations law requiring the court to consider the best interest of a companion animal when awarding possession in a divorce or separation proceeding. New subsection (5)(d)(15) states, "in awarding the possession of a companion animal, the court shall consider the best interest of such animal. “Companion animal”, as used in this subparagraph, shall have the same meaning as in subdivision five of section three hundred fifty of the agriculture and markets law."

Summary: This New York case concerns a challenge to the New York City Local Law No. 2019/202 that prohibits restaurants and retail food establishments within the City of New York from selling or serving foie gras and other force-fed products. Petitioner City of New York challenges the final determination of respondents Richard A. Ball, as Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets, and the Department of Agriculture and Markets, which found that Local Law 202 unreasonably restricts and regulates farming operations within the agricultural districts where foie gras is produced, contrary to Agriculture and Markets Law (“AML”) § 305-a. The City argued that Local Law 202 does not impact AML § 305-a because it does not have a direct impact on the farms that produce the foie gras in the agricultural district in the county where it is produced. According to the City, Local Law 202 merely prohibits restaurants and food establishments within the City from selling force-fed products, and the Farms remain free to continue producing foie gras in agricultural districts through force-feeding. In looking at the statute text, this court found that a restriction on processes used within farm operations of agricultural districts fits within the purview of the statute. While New York has adopted broad home-rule powers, their scope is limited to regulation in the territorial boundaries. The testimony and legislative history of Local Law 202 demonstrates that the goal of the law was animal welfare as opposed to human health or safety; these practices are reasonably tied to farming practices in outside agricultural districts. Thus, the measure falls within the scope of AML § 305-a as a “local law” that “restrict[s] or regulate[s] farm operations in agricultural districts." While the City has a legitimate desire to protect animals from a cruel practice, it cannot do so in a manner that is inconsistent with state law. The court noted that the state legislature is free to "recalibrate" the statutory construction of AML § 305-a to allow animal welfare concerns, but, in its current form, that would be inconsistent with the language. The motions of intervenors were dismissed, the Petition was denied in all respects, and the proceeding was dismissed.

Summary: This case was filed by the previous owner (plaintiff) of an Abyssinian cat named Murchik, who was seeking to recover possession of the cat. Plaintiff took care of the cat for several years, but eventually lost their job and their housing, and needed to give the cat to a friend (defendant) who agreed to house the cat while plaintiff was living in a shelter. Plaintiff and defendant eventually disagreed over who was the rightful owner of the cat, with plaintiff insisting that defendant was temporarily watching the cat and defendant insisting that they were the rightful owner of the cat. Plaintiff filed this case to repossess the cat. The court considered that New York law traditionally treated companion animals as personal property, and the party with the superior possessory right to the animal would be awarded the animal. However, the court was moving towards a "best for all concerned" standard, which would consider factors such as why each party would benefit from possession of the pet, and under whose possession the cat would have a better chance of thriving. The court found that plaintiff had the superior possessory right in the cat, since plaintiff was the original purchaser of the cat and there was no evidence that plaintiff intended to give the cat to defendant permanently. The court then looked to the other factors, and found that since plaintiff's living situation had stabilized, both parties were equally capable of ensuring the cat would thrive in their care. However, since plaintiff had cared for the cat for over five years, and defendant had cared for the cat for under a year, plaintiff had a slight advantage in showing they could care for the cat. Therefore, the court awarded possession of the cat to plaintiff.

Summary: This is a family law case concerning, among other issues, the euthanasia of a family companion animal. Defendant argues that Plaintiff violated an order in place by putting the family dog down without reason, necessity, and justification, and that the dog was an emotional support animal whose custody had not been determined. Defendant also argues that plaintiff did not allow defendant the opportunity to spend time with the dog before it was put down, and that he suffered emotional distress due to the dog's death. The court found that the euthanasia of the family dog did not violate the order in place, because the companion animal was not classified as "property" or an "asset" under the order in place, and that animals are afforded additional protection under the Family Court Act. Whether the animal was put down unnecessarily could be considered animal cruelty, but that inquiry would need to be determined in a criminal proceeding, and criminal charges were not filed. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff did not violate the order by euthanizing the family dog.

Summary: This is an appeal of a personal injury case brought by plaintiff, the mother of the injured child, against the owners of a dog that caused the injury and the owners of the restaurant where the injury occurred. The injury took place at a dog-friendly restaurant both parties were dining at, where the dog owned by defendants bit a three-year-old infant. Plaintiff alleges that the restaurant owners knew of the dog’s vicious propensities but allowed it on the premises, and are liable along with the owners of the dog for the injuries sustained by her child. Defendant restaurant owners contend that they did not know of the dog’s vicious propensities, and that their restaurant requires that dogs be leashed and the dog was leashed at the time of the bite. Plaintiff argues that, under the Hewitt case, a standard negligence analysis should be used rather than an analysis based on knowledge of vicious propensities. Plaintiffs also argue defendant restaurant owners owed a duty of care to their customers, which was breached by allowing a dangerous dog on the premises. The lower court denied defendants motion for summary judgment because there were unresolved issues of fact as to the restaurant defendants’ duty to their patrons and the foreseeability of the injury. This appeal followed. On appeal, the court reversed the order of the lower court because defendants established that they did not have any knowledge of the vicious propensities of the dog and that they exercised reasonable care through their signage and policies to protect restaurant patrons from the risk of harm that allowing animals on the premises poses. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them is granted.

Summary: This is an appeal of a verdict to convict defendant of aggravated cruelty to animals. Defendant was walking his two pit bull dogs and allowed the dogs enough leash space to reach a pet cat resting on the steps of its owner’s porch. The cat’s owners, who were witnesses to this event, watched as the pit bulls mauled their pet cat. When the witnesses asked defendant to stop his dogs, defendant attempted to flee with his dogs still carrying the cat’s body in its mouth. The witnesses pursued and eventually, the dog dropped the deceased cat’s body. Defendant was charged with aggravated cruelty to animals and overdriving, torturing and injuring animals, and failure to provide proper sustenance. Defendant was convicted, and appealed the aggravated animal cruelty charge. Defendant argues that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence. The court here found that defendant was well aware that the dogs were aggressive, even keeping them separate from his young son because of their propensity to attack smaller animals. There was also testimony from another neighbor of defendant allowing his dogs to chase feral cats off her porch without stopping them, and testimony regarding defendant’s dog previously mauling a smaller dog without defendant intervening to stop them. Defendant was warned by animal control to muzzle them, but refused to do so. Defendant also bragged to co-workers about how he let his pit bulls go after other dogs and attack wild and old animals. Accordingly, the court found that defendant was aware of the dogs’ aggressive behavior and affirmed the holding of the lower court.