North Carolina

Summary: In this zoning dispute, plaintiffs Kimberly Dunckel and Fairytale Farm Animal Sanctuary appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the City of Winston-Salem, which had prohibited them from operating a nonprofit animal sanctuary housing 60-70 farm animals on their residentially zoned (RS-9) property after an anonymous complaint triggered a code enforcement investigation. The central novel animal law issue was whether the city's classification of the sanctuary as analogous to an animal shelter or kennel—uses expressly prohibited in residential districts—and its consequent shutdown order violated the plaintiffs' fundamental right to earn a living under North Carolina's Fruits of Their Labor Clause and Law of the Land Clause. Applying the two-part test from Kinsley v. Ace Speedway, the court held that the city's actual purpose—preserving the residential character of neighborhoods to promote health, safety, and welfare—constituted a proper governmental purpose, and that enforcing the zoning ordinance against the sanctuary was a reasonable means to achieve that end because the commercial use (including paid events with hundreds of guests) altered the neighborhood's residential nature. The court further rejected plaintiffs' equal protection argument, finding rational bases to distinguish the sanctuary from residents with personal pets (non-commercial), home daycares, schools, and churches (uses integral to residential life or constitutionally protected). Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the city, concluding that while the plaintiffs were burdened, they were not entirely prohibited from operating the sanctuary elsewhere in commercially or industrially zoned districts.

Summary: This case examined whether Defendants' commercial poultry operations—including hatching, transporting, and slaughtering chickens—fell under exemptions in North Carolina's Protection of Animals Act (PAA). Plaintiff, an animal advocacy group, alleged Defendants subjected chickens to cruel treatment, such as starvation, crushing, overheating, and boiling alive, violating the PAA's prohibition on unjustifiable suffering. The appellate court affirmed dismissal, holding that the PAA's exemptions for "lawful activities conducted for the production of poultry" and "providing food for human or animal consumption" shielded Defendants' entire operation, not just isolated steps in the process. The court rejected Plaintiff's argument that each stage of production should be scrutinized individually, ruling instead that the statute's plain language protected lawful commercial farming as a whole. Because Plaintiff failed to allege Defendants' overarching business was unlawful, the court upheld the dismissal, thereby reinforcing agricultural exemptions in animal cruelty statutes and affirming the trial court's order.

Summary: The Court of Appeals affirmed, as modified, a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) granting Plaintiff custody of the parties' emotional support dog, Melo, and restraining Defendant from animal cruelty under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a)(9)(b1), but struck an overbroad social media restriction. The dispute arose when Defendant struck Plaintiff with her car while fleeing with both dogs after refusing Plaintiff’s proposed "coparenting" arrangement, causing Plaintiff physical injury and emotional distress. Though the trial court improperly incorporated Plaintiff’s complaint as findings without independent analysis, which violated Rule 52(a)(1)’s requirement for logical reasoning, the remaining findings (supported by Plaintiff’s testimony about the vehicular assault) sufficed to establish domestic violence under § 50B-3(a). The Court upheld the animal-related provisions as authorized discretionary relief, emphasizing that companion animals may be protected under DVPOs to prevent further harm, but narrowed the order to ensure proportionality.

Summary: In this North Carolina case, Defendant Jeffrey Lee Johnson appeals from judgments entered upon guilty verdicts of one count of felony cruelty to animals and two counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals. The conviction stems from a search of defendant's property after a phone call was made to animal control about a strong smell was coming from the property. After failing to reach the defendant by phone, animal control officers drove to the property and observed a "very, very strong odor" of ammonia, feces, and "the smell of rot." As the officers walked up the driveway, they encountered a chained dog ("Chubby") who presented with an irritated neck, worn down teeth, overgrown nails, and multiple scabs. Other dogs were observed without access to water, including a box filled with puppies and dried feces. This prompted the officers to check on the other dogs in the backyard. One dog was breathing shallowly and appeared at first to be deceased. After sending photos of the dogs to the magistrate, probable cause was found to charge the defendant with animal cruelty and impound the dogs for their safety. In total, 21 dogs were seized, two of which had to be euthanized. At trial, the court denied defendant's motion to suppress, and defendant was ultimately convicted at trial. On Appeal, defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred by concluding that a warrantless search of his home's curtilage was reasonable due to exigent circumstances and by denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of that search and the search of his home. This court found that there was no unreasonable search since it occurred while officers were walking up the driveway and "in a place where the public is allowed to be." The seizure of the dog Chubby was justified under the plain view doctrine. In addition, the officers held a reasonable belief that the other dogs observed on the property needed immediate aid to prevent further suffering. Thus, exigent circumstances existed supporting the seizure of the other dogs. Finally, after the plain view discoveries, there was a substantial basis for probable cause to search the property and its buildings that supported the search warrant that was eventually granted. The dogs were present and would have fallen under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, this court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress.

Summary: In this North Carolina case, the defendant appeals from his conviction of felony cruelty to animals and suspended sentence of imprisonment. The conviction stems from Defendant's kicking of his neighbor's dog. According to testimony of the dog's owner, Defendant would activate sprinklers in his yard anytime someone with a dog walked by his home. In November of 2019, the dog's owner was walking her fourteen-year-old dachshund-beagle mix, Davis, in front of Defendant's house when she stepped out of the roadway onto Defendant's lawn to avoid a passing car. The occupants of the car then stopped to talk with the dog's owner briefly, whereupon Defendant emerged from his home and proceeded to kick Davis in the stomach. The dog's owner called the police and the dog was transported to an emergency veterinarian because he was "lifeless" and "limp." Defendant was ultimately charged, indicted, and convicted of felonious cruelty to animals. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charge of felonious cruelty to animals because a single kick was insufficient to show that Defendant "cruelly beat" the dog; and (2) that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor cruelty to animals. This court first addressed whether a single kick to a dog was sufficient to meet the definition of "cruelly beat." Looking first at the standard dictionary definition of "beat," the court found that the words, “cruelly beat” can apply to any act that causes the unjustifiable pain, suffering, or death to an animal, even if it is just one single act. In fact, the court stated, "[t]o hold otherwise would allow a person to kick a dog so hard they suffer life-threatening injuries—such as the case here—but not be subject to felonious cruelty to animals because it was 'just' one kick." Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. As to the lesser included offense instruction, this court found that there was no evidence of error, let alone plain error, since the jury would have likely found Defendant guilty of felonious animal cruelty based on the evidence presented. No reversible error occurred and Defendant's conviction was affirmed.

Summary: This is an action for veterinary malpractice brought by the owner of a horse against a veterinarian that performed the castration surgery that led to the death of the horse. The trial court refused to allow a veterinarian with experience practicing in the same area and with a similar background to testify about whether he was familiar the accepted standards or to answer questions to elicit his opinion about whether defendant's treatment of the horse was unacceptable for practicing veterinarians in the area. The trial court then granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and this appeal followed. The court held that the judge erred in excluding the testimony, and reversed and remanded the case.

Summary: This reflects Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Request for Injunctive Relief. In a press release, Plaintiff Legal Impact for Chickens states, "[t]oday, one of the country’s largest poultry producers and a KFC supplier, Case Farms, was sued by animal-welfare charity Legal Impact for Chickens (LIC) in Burke County District Court for its pattern of gross mismanagement and animal cruelty. The complaint comes on the heels of a 2021 undercover investigation by animal advocacy group Animal Outlook, revealing a trend of cruel and deadly abuse at a Morganton, N.C. Case Farms hatchery that processes more than 200,000 chicks daily. LIC accuses Case Farms of violating both industry standards and North Carolina law."

Summary: Defendant Cheito Charles appealed from judgments entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of second-degree arson and felonious cruelty to animals. The incident stemmed from a house fire in the summer of 2020 where the defendant set fire to his sister's boyfriend's house while the boyfriend's puppy was still inside. At trial, the defendant contended that there was no evidence that he knew the existence of the puppy. However, the trial court instructed the jury that, in order to convict Defendant of felonious cruelty to animals, the jury need only conclude that Defendant maliciously and “intentionally start[ed] a house fire which proximately result[ed] in the injury or death to the animal.” There was no need to prove that Defendant was aware of the puppy in the home. Ultimately, Defendant was convicted of second-degree arson and felonious cruelty to animals. On appeal here, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent regarding the animal cruelty charge. This court rebuffed this argument, finding that there was no error with instruction since the jury only needed to conclude that Defendant maliciously set the fire that proximately caused the puppy's death. This same reasoning also supported the sufficiency of the evidence claim. The court dispensed with Defendant's final argument as to the sufficiency of the indictment. As a result, the appellate court found no error with Defendant's trial.

Summary: Defendant Karen Siegel was convicted of 31 misdemeanor counts of animal cruelty based on 31 breeding dogs that were seized from her home. At issue here on appeal by defendant is whether the underlying statutes that allows seizure of the animals, Arkansas Code Annotated sections 5-62-106 and 5-62-111, are constitutional. In addition, defendant argues that by not ordering return of the seized dogs to defendant and compensating defendant for her loss of property was error. The first circuit court criminal case was dismissed on speedy-trial grounds and that ruling was upheld in later appeal. The issues on the instant appeal relate to the status of the seized dogs. Siegel argues that the circuit court erred by not ordering the return of her seized property and also not assigning a value for the property that was destroyed or damaged. The court here looked at the language of the seizure statute and found that Siegel failed to post a bond to care for the dog as is contemplated by the statute. The statute provides no award of damages to a defendant and the county that seized the dog is not a party in the criminal action brought by the state. Thus, the lower court was correct in stating that Siegel's remedy was a separate civil action. As to Siegel's challenges to the constitutionality of those statutes, this court found the argument moot since review of the issue would have no practical legal effect upon a then-existing controversy. The case was affirmed in part and dismissed as moot in part.

Summary: Defendant Daniel Crew appealed his convictions for dogfighting, felony cruelty to animals, misdemeanor cruelty to animals, and restraining dogs in a cruel manner. Crew also challenges the trial court's restitution orders totaling $70,000, which the trial court immediately converted to civil judgments. The arrest and conviction of defendant stemmed from an investigation at defendant's residence, where 30 pit bulls were recovered with injuries "similar to injuries a dog would sustain through dogfighting." In addition, publications and notes on preparing for a fight were found, as well as dogfighting training equipment such as a "jenny," staging area for fights, and weight scales for weighing dogs. The State charged Crew with fifteen counts of engaging in dogfighting, one count of allowing property to be used for dogfighting, five counts of felony cruelty to animals, twenty-five counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, and sixteen counts of restraining dogs in a cruel manner. Ultimately, Crew was convicted by the jury of eleven counts of dogfighting, three counts of felony cruelty to animals, fourteen counts of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, and two counts of restraining dogs in a cruel manner. The trial court imposed six consecutive active sentences of 10 to 21 months each along with several suspended sentences. The trial court also ordered Crew to pay Orange County Animal Services $10,000 in seven separate restitution orders that were then entered as civil judgments, totaling $70,000 in restitution (testimony at trial indicated that the cost to house the dogs alone was a "a littler over $80,000"). Defendant appealed his criminal judgment and petitioned for a writ of certiorari for the award of restitution entered as civil judgments. On appeal, this court rejected defendant's claim that there was insufficient evidence of dogfighting. The police found training equipment, medication commonly used in dogfighting operations, and a dogfighting "pit" or training area as well as the notes preparing dogs to fight. A reasonable juror could have concluded that Crew intended to engage in dogfighting. However, as to the restitution order converted to civil judgments, the court found that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to immediately convert those restitution orders into civil judgments. The court found no error concerning the criminal convictions, but vacated the conversion of the restitution to civil judgments against defendant.