Michigan

Summary: In January of 2005, the Detroit City Council passed an ordinance granting special police powers to officers working in the Animal Control Division (ACD). The ordinance allowed ACD officers to have “the right of entry without a warrant” for the purpose of capturing or restraining any animal. Detroit residents filed a petition arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional and the court granted a petition for a preliminary injunction on the basis that the ordinance violated the Fourth Amendment. Following the injunction a number of residents filed suit seeking damages against the City of Detroit arguing that the City improperly seized their pets and failed to provide adequate post-deprivation remedies. Lastly, the residents argued that the City operated its animal shelter in a “grossly negligent manner” after numerous dogs suffered severe illnesses after having been taken to the shelter for quarantine by the ACD. The court reviewed the testimonies of the individual residents who claimed that their pets had been improperly seized and determined that the seizures of the pets were “objectionably reasonable.” In order to determine whether the seizures were “objectionably reasonable” the court stated that it “must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake by analyzing the totality of the circumstances.” Ultimately, the court found that it was reasonable for the officers to have seize the pets in each situation based on the facts presented and therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Detroit. Finally, the court reviewed the residents’ arguments pertaining to the Fourteenth Amendment and held that because the vast majority of the pets were found “unrestrained, unlicensed, abandoned by their owner, or accused of biting another animal or human,” the City’s interest in protecting the public was far greater than any “pre-seizure due process owed to the plaintiffs.” As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. With regard to the residents’ claim about the state of the City’s animal shelter, the court declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction and therefore dismissed the claim.

Summary: This Michigan law relates to an action for a personal protection order to restrain/enjoin several categories of individuals: (1) a spouse or former spouse; (2) a person with whom the petitioner has a child in common; (3) a person in a dating relationship with petitioner; or (4) an individual who resided or is residing in the same household as the petitioner. Effective August 1, 2016, the order may now restrain or enjoin those mentioned individuals from engaging in the following actions if that person has the intent to cause the petitioner mental distress or to exert control over the petitioner with respect to an animal in which the petitioner has an ownership interest (subsection (1)(k)): (1) injuring, killing, torturing, neglecting, or threatening to injure, kill, torture, or neglect the animal; (2) removing the animal from the petitioner's possession; or (3) retaining or obtaining possession of the animal. Section 29 describes the criteria under which a petitioner is deemed to have an ownership interest in an animal.

Summary: This case involves challenges to the courtroom procedure of allowing a witness to be accompanied on the witness stand by a support animal. Defendant Johnson appealed his convictions of criminal sexual assault after he was convicted of assaulting his six-year-old niece. During Defendant's trial, a black Labrador retriever was permitted, to accompany the six-year-old victim to the witness stand. On appeal, the Defendant first argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the use of a support animal because MCL 600.2163a(4) only allows a support person. The Court of Appeals of Michigan stated that the trial court had the inherent authority to utilize support animals. Secondly, the Defendant argued that trial counsel should have objected to the notice of a support person on the basis that allowing the witnesses to testify accompanied by the support animal violated his constitutional right to due process. The Court of Appeals stated that there is no indication that the support dog used was visible to the jury, or that he barked, growled, or otherwise interrupted the proceedings. Therefore, the objection was meritless. Next, the Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request various procedural protections if the support animal was used. The Court of Appeals stated that the use of a support dog did not implicate the Confrontation Clause; the presence of the dog did not affect the witnesses' competency to testify or affect the oath given to the witnesses; the witnesses were still subject to cross-examination; and the trier of fact was still afforded the unfettered opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor. Finally, the Defendant argued that a limiting instruction should have been provided to the jury when the support animal was utilized and this rendered his counsel ineffective. The Court of Appeals stated, that there are no Michigan jury instructions addressing the use of a support animal. Counsel was then not ineffective in failing to ask for an instruction that does not yet exist in Michigan. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence and remanded.

Summary: This chapter of Michigan laws deals with animals running at large. In Michigan, an owner cannot allow an animal (defined here as cattle, horses, sheep, swine, mules, burros, or goats) to run at large. In addition, a person that is not the owner of the animal cannot willfully and knowingly allow the animal to run at large. Any person who allows an animal to run at large will be guilty of a misdemeanor. Law enforcement is authorized to take possession of any animal that is running at large. Once the animal is in possession of law enforcement, the owner of the animal must be notified or a notice must be placed in the newspaper within 30 days.

Summary: This chapter of Michigan laws deals with the removal, capture, or destruction of gray wolves. According to the laws, a landowner is able to use any means necessary to remove a gray wolf from its property, including lethal force, if the gray wolf is threatening the landowners livestock or dog(s). Once a landowner has removed, captured, or destroyed a gray wolf, the landowner must report it to a department official no later than 12 hours after the removal, capture, or destruction. According to Section 324.95167, the act is not operative until final appellate court issues a decision overruling the decision of The Humane Society of the United States v Dirk Kempthorne that allows removal of wolves from the federal ESA list, or the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service promulgates a final rule dated after March 12, 2007 that removes gray wolves located in this state from the list of endangered and threatened wildlife established under the federal endangered species act of 1973 and that final rule takes effect.

Summary: This Michigan statute makes a person liable and guilty of a misdemeanor if any animal on the person's property is exposed to or consumes a known poisonous substance. The statute makes an exception for poisons that are mixed only with vegetables or poisons for the destruction of predatory or dangerous prowling animals.

Summary: This Michigan statute makes it a misdemeanor for an individual to knowingly sell any horse or dog meat unless it is plainly labelled.

Summary: The attached document is the Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief in the case of Daniels v. City of Ann Arbor, Michigan for the protection of natural resources. Plaintiff Sally Daniels challenged the City of Ann Arbor's current "deer cull" of 100 deer from public parks and nature areas in the City by marksmen from APHIS. Plaintiff contends that this cull of deer, a natural resource held in the public trust, violates state law (the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA) and the DNR's Wildlife Conservation Order (WCO)). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that there has been no showing under NREPA that the deer have caused damage to horticultural or agricultural crops under either act contrary to state law. Plaintiff also states that the methods used - firearms with silencers, deer baiting, and the shooting of deer from vehicles - also violate the NREPA and/or WCO.

Summary: This Michigan law states that when a person delivers any horse, mule, neat cattle, sheep, or swine to be kept or cared for to another person, that person shall have a lien thereon for the keeping and care of such animals, and may retain possession of the same until such charges are paid.

Summary: This is a short over view of Michigan Great Ape law.