Massachusetts

Summary: The defendant, Amanda L. Bonia, was convicted of animal cruelty under G. L. c. 272, § 77, after a jury found that she unnecessarily failed to provide proper food, drink, or shelter to her dog, Kayla. The evidence at trial revealed that Kayla was discovered on the defendant’s porch in a state of severe distress, described by the animal control officer as “very emaciated, a lot of bones, just gasping for air,” with her “body functions appear[ing] to be stopping” during transport. Veterinary records from the animal hospital documented Kayla as having “[m]oderate to [s]evere” dehydration, an “emaciated body condition,” “severe diffuse muscle wasting,” and an unkempt coat with “hair loss over pressure points on [her] pelvis, hind limbs, [and] shoulders” containing mud, dirt, and “unidentifiable ectoparasites,” after which she was euthanized due to her ongoing suffering. On appeal, the defendant argued that she was prejudiced by two struck hearsay statements, that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the Commonwealth must prove she intended the dog to suffer, and that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. The appellate court held that the curative instructions were sufficient to remedy any prejudice from the struck testimony, and it clarified that the charged provision does not require proof of an intent to cause suffering but only that the defendant intentionally failed to provide the animal’s basic needs. While the court found the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction based on the failure to provide proper shelter, it concluded that the evidence including testimony that Kayla was repeatedly left outside without food or water on warm days and the animal’s documented emaciated and dehydrated condition was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unnecessarily failed to provide proper food and drink. The judgment of conviction was accordingly affirmed.

Summary: This Massachusetts law, effective January of 2025, states that no person shall allow for or cause the participation of a covered animal in a traveling animal act. Violation incurs a civil penalty of not less than $500 and not more than $10,000 per animal involved in the violation.

Summary: The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for animal cruelty under G. L. c. 272, § 77, after witnesses observed him repeatedly punch his dog in the head while visibly angry in a public park, purportedly to stop the dog from attacking a groundhog. The defendant claimed he acted to protect the groundhog and minimized harm by "pulling his punches," but eyewitnesses testified he struck the dog forcefully five to ten times over 30–40 seconds, with one bystander confronting him about the beating. At trial, the judge excluded the defense’s veterinary technician expert from testifying about the dog’s pain response and "prey drive," and declined to give requested jury instructions on bona fide discipline and defense of another animal. The court held that excluding the expert testimony was either harmless or cumulative, as the jury heard other evidence about the dog’s lack of injuries and aggressive behavior. Furthermore, the standard jury instructions—which required the Commonwealth to prove the defendant inflicted "severe or unnecessary pain without justifiable cause"—adequately covered his theories of defense, making supplemental instructions unnecessary. Thus, finding no reversible error, the court upheld the conviction.

Summary: This Massachusetts statute makes it a crime to enter any premises in which animals are being housed or used in research by a research institution and, without authority, cause damage and/or trespass.

Summary: This case is an appeal concerning an agreement to share possession of a dog between a couple that had ended their relationship. The lower court granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the court of appeals vacated the order, then this appeal followed. The parties purchased the dog together while they were still a couple, and agreed to share the dog if they broke up. After the relationship eventually ended, the couple shared the dog on a two week alternating basis. Eventually, one party maintained custody of the dog and denied the other party access to the dog, so plaintiff filed this action for conversion and breach of contract, seeking specific performance of the custody agreement for the dog. The court here found that the dog is jointly owned property, the lack of a written contract does not bar the plaintiff from specific performance, and that the judge's order of specific performance was a suitable remedy since monetary damages would not allow plaintiff access to his shared property. Therefore, the court reversed the order vacating the preliminary injunction and denied the defendant's petition for relief from the preliminary injunction.

Summary: This is a case regarding an animal cruelty charge brought against defendant, the owner of an elderly, terminally ill dog. First, defendant’s family brought the fourteen-year-old dog to an animal hospital. The staff at the hospital examined the dog, which had a large mass on his side, and recommended that the dog have surgery to remove the mass. Defendant did not authorize the surgery, and instead took the dog home. Three weeks later, defendant brought the dog back to the animal hospital, where the staff noticed that his condition had worsened significantly. At this point, the veterinarian recommended humane euthanasia to end the dog’s suffering, but defendant declined and requested the surgery. The veterinarian declined, claiming the dog would not survive the surgery, and defendant took the dog home saying they would have another vet euthanize the dog. The veterinarian reported defendant to the Animal Rescue League of Boston, who conducted a welfare check on the dog and found it in very poor health. When the Animal Rescue League asked defendant to euthanize the dog or get him medical attention, defendant declined and insisted the dog would die at home. Defendants were charged with violating the animal cruelty statute, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint was granted, and this appeal followed. The question on appeal is whether defendant’s conduct in refusing to euthanize the dog constitutes animal cruelty under the statute. The Commonwealth argues that the animal cruelty statute covers the conduct of one who has charge of an animal but, rather than inflicting the harm directly, “authorizes or permits” the animal “to be subjected to” harm, and that keeping the dog in a state of suffering rather than euthanizing the dog fits this definition. However, after examining case law, the court could not find a case in which a person's failure to euthanize an animal was interpreted as “subjecting” an animal to harm, and did not want to extend the statute that far. The court affirmed the holding of the lower court.

Summary: Plaintiff and farmer James Dunn brought suit to challenge the attorney general’s certification of Massachusetts Question 3. Dunn was joined by anti-poverty activist Diane Sullivan. Both plaintiffs received funding from Protect the Harvest, a nonprofit that opposes farming restrictions, to pursue the lawsuit. Plaintiffs argued that Question 3’s ban on the production and the sale of products made from restrictively confined animals were unrelated questions. Plaintiffs also argued that the bans on confinement of egg lying hens, pregnant pigs, and calves for veal were separate issues on which voters may have varying opinions, so they should be voted on separately. They also argued that the ballot measure’s statement of purpose improperly contained an “argumentative” policy statement that taints the petition and unfairly sways public opinion. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the ballot measure was compliant with the state’s requirements and that the attorney general properly certified Question 3 for submission to the public.

Summary: This 2022 Massachusetts law mandates that EMS personnel provide emergency treatment to a police dog injured in the line of duty and transport such police dog by ambulance to a veterinary care facility equipped to provide emergency treatment to dogs. EMS personnel shall not transport an injured police dog if providing such transport would inhibit their ability to provide emergency medical attention or transport to a person requiring such services. The law also outlines training for EMS personnel in treating police dogs.

Summary: This case involves an appeal of an animal cruelty conviction after defendant repeatedly stabbed a dog named Smokey, a three-year old pit bull. The incident in question occurred on a street outside of defendant's barber shop. Smokey was on-leash walking with his owner when an unleashed smaller dog ran at Smokey and began biting his ankles. Smokey responded playfully, not aggressively. The defendant responded to calls of assistance from the smaller dog's owner and helped separate the dogs. After this, the defendant returned briefly to his barbershop and came back with a knife that he used to repeatedly stab Smokey with while he restrained the dog with his other arm. The police eventually responded and defendant was taken to the hospital for a laceration on his hand where he yelled, "I'm glad I killed the [expletive] dog." Smokey survived the attack and defendant was charged and convicted. On appeal, defendant raised several arguments challenging the verdict. In particular, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that he stabbed Smokey repeatedly to release the dog from biting his hand. The appellate court found that no defense witnesses testified that Smokey bit defendant and the no medical records corroborated defendant's version of events. Defendant also argued that the judged erred in denying his motion in limine regarding Smokey prior and subsequent "bad acts," which, defendant claimed, were relevant to the issue of Smokey as the initial aggressor. This court found that the proffered evidence of bad acts was inadmissible hearsay and the acts subsequent to Smokey's stabbing occurred too remotely to have any probative value. Finally, the court found no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where the judge failed to give a sua sponte necessity defense. The judgment was affirmed.

Summary: This Massachusetts law states that no person shall travel on a way with a sleigh or sled drawn by a horse, unless there are at least three bells attached to some part of the harness.