Georgia

Summary: The Georgia law on protection orders in family violence situations was amended in 2025 to include pets. Under amendments to subsection (8), a court may grant a protective order that includes provisions for the possession of personal property, "including the care, custody, and control of any animal owned, possessed, kept, or held as a household pet by either party or by a minor child living in the household or residence of either party." In addition, the order may order the respondent to refrain from harassing or harming a pet, taking or transferring a pet, and engaging in conduct that violates Code Section 16-12-4 (the state's primary animal cruelty law).

Summary: In this interlocutory appeal from a civil forfeiture proceeding, the Court addressed the application of the independent source doctrine to a warrant predicated on observations of animal cruelty, where the initial investigation involved a warrantless drone flight over the appellant's property. Assuming arguendo that the drone flight constituted an unlawful search, the Court's analysis centered on the two-prong test for the independent source doctrine: first, whether the warrant affidavit, after excising any information gleaned from the illegal drone surveillance, established probable cause for the search, and second, whether the law enforcement officer's decision to seek the warrant was prompted by the observations from the illicit drone flight. The Court held the warrant was valid, as the affidavit was based solely on evidence independently obtained during a subsequent in-person visit, which was initiated by a separate citizen complaint about a loose and malnourished dog and during which officers, from a lawful vantage point on a public road, observed two dogs in the front yard in conditions indicative of cruelty and heard a large number of dogs barking from the rear of the property, leading them to discover approximately 67 mistreated and malnourished dogs. Consequently, the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was affirmed, the disposition being that the warrant was supported by an independent source of probable cause unrelated to the prior drone overflight.

Summary: This Georgia law relates to the rescue of animals from vehicles in emergency situations. Unlike other states with "pets in hot cars" laws, this Georgia law appears in the title related to liability for law enforcement actions rather than in the anti-cruelty laws. A law enforcement officer shall not be liable at law for any action or actions done while performing any duty at the scene of an emergency except for gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, or malfeasance. “Emergency” means an occurrence involving, or appearing to involve, a clear and imminent danger or threat to life, health, or property, including, but not limited to, the rescuing of a person or pet from a locked vehicle when such person or pet remaining within such vehicle presents a clear and imminent danger to such person's or pet's life or health.

Summary: This Georgia regulation states that all dogs and cats twelve (12) weeks of age or older entering Georgia must have proof of a current and approved rabies vaccination in accordance with the most recent Compendium of Animal Rabies Control published by the National Association of State Public Health Veterinarians, Inc. It also provides other requirements for importation of pets.

Summary: Josh Gomez took his dog, Pilot, to Pet First Animal Hospital because Pilot was lethargic and throwing up. Gary Innocent, the veterinarian, diagnosed Pilot with parvo virus that could have killed him if left untreated. Innocent gave Gomez an estimate of $1,453.25 for the dog’s care. The animal hospital required full payment up front, but Gomez could not afford to pay so Innocent accepted $400 for one night’s care. Gomez left the dog for the night and called the following day. He was informed that he owed an additional $751.25. Gomez paid the $751.25 on the following day. Upon picking up Pilot from the animal hospital he was informed that he owed an additional $484.80. Gomez could not pay the $484.80 so Innocent asked Gomez to leave Pilot at the animal hospital until the bill was paid. Gomez obliged and left Pilot there. After Pilot was at the animal hospital for 20 days, a good Samaritan paid the dog’s accrued bill of $972. Gomez sued, alleging that Innocent and PetFirst breached their contract by refusing to return the dog after he paid the amounts agreed to, but before he paid “additional sums not agreed to by the parties in their initial contract.” The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Innocent and PetFirst. This appeal followed. Gomez claimed that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed as to the validity of the veterinary lien statute. The Court stated that Innocent was a licensed veterinarian who, at Gomez’s request, treated Gomez’s dog. Gomez signed a treatment authorization form and was informed that all professional fees were due at the time services were rendered. A detailed written estimate of the expected treatments and costs was given to Gomez which stated that the total final bill could vary from the estimate. Gomez did not present any evidence creating an issue of material fact as to the accuracy or validity of any of the charges on the itemized bill that Innocent produced. Innocent met his burden by showing that he acted properly in relying on the veterinary lien statute to retain the dog when Gomez failed to pay. The Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

Summary: This Georgia regulation has an exception for dogs in outdoor dining areas in the subsection of the regulation that prohibits animals in food service establishments. Subsection (5)(o)(vi) states that pet dogs may be allowed in outside dining areas of a food establishment provided patrons access the area from the outdoors and several other conditions are met. Pet dogs must not come into contact with any serving dishes, utensils, or tableware nor are they allowed on chairs, tables, or other furnishings. Employees and consumers must not provide food to pet dogs. The pet dogs must be kept on a leash and under control of the consumer at all times. At no time is the pet dog allowed to travel through the interior portion of the food service establishment. The establishment must also establish processes for training employees not to handle or pet the dogs and a procedure and equipment for the clean up of pet waste.

Summary: This Georgia involves an interlocutory appeal arising from a dog bite lawsuit. In 2016, Plaintiff Saulsbury was walking her English Bulldog past Defendant Wilson's house when Wilson's pitbull dog escaped its crate in the open garage. A fight ensued between the dogs. Wilson then attempted to break up the fight and was allegedly bitten by Saulsbury's dog, suffering a broken arm in the process and necessitating a course of rabies shots. The Saulsburys then sued the Wilsons in magistrate court to recover hospital and veterinary expenses. Wilson counterclaimed for her injuries in excess $15,000, thus transferring the case to superior court. At this time, the Saulsburys moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals here reverses that denial. The court found that Wilson assumed the risk when she intervened in a dog fight with her bare hands. In particular, the court observed that assumption of risk serves as a complete defense to negligence. That finding was bolstered by the fact that Wilson had knowledge that her dog had previously bitten other persons and had admitted to breaking up previous dog fights with a stick. The court relied on previous case law showing that all animals, even domesticated animals, pose a risk as does the act of breaking up even human fights. The court was not persuaded by the fact that Saulsbury may have been in violation of various DeKalb County ordinances related to an owner's responsibility to control his or her animal. A plain reading of those ordinances does not impose a duty on the part of an owner to "dangerously insert herself into a dog fight." The court found the lower court erred in denying the Saulsbury's motion for summary judgment and reversed and remanded the case.

Summary: Misty Wyno was attacked and killed by a neighbor’s dog. Her husband, Jason Wyno brought a wrongful death action against the dog’s owners, Lowndes County, and four individual Lowndes County Animal Control employees. Jason alleged that Lowndes County and the County Employees negligently failed to perform ministerial duties, negligently failed to provide police protection, negligently created and failed to abate a nuisance, were negligent in their control of allegedly dangerous dogs, and were negligent per se by violating several provisions of the Lowndes County Animal Control Ordinance. Jason also alleged that the County Employees acted with actual malice and/or an intent to injure by repeatedly refusing to investigate or take any action with regards to the dangerous dogs. Lowndes County asserted sovereign immunity as a defense for both itself and its employees. In addition, Lowndes County and the County Employees asserted that they were immune from liability due to the provisions of the Dangerous Dog Control Law in effect at the time. The trial court dismissed the suit against the employees in their individual capacities finding that the Dangerous Dog Control Law barred an action against any party except the dog’s owners. The Supreme Court of Georgia ultimately held that the record was devoid of any evidence that any of the County Employees acted with malice or the intent to harm Jason or Misty Wyno to defeat official immunity. Jason, therefore, did not satisfy his burden and the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Summary: Defendants appeal from an order granting a petition for recoupment of costs filed by Habersham County pursuant to OCGA § 4-11-9.8, and a separate order directing the defendants to pay $69,282.85 into the court registry in connection with the boarding, treatment, and care of 29 dogs that the Brambletts refused to surrender after the County seized over 400 animals from their property. In April 2017, over 400 animals were removed from the Bramblett's property and they were charged with over 340 counts of cruelty to animals under Georgia law. There were 29 animals that were not surrendered and were running loose on the property. The current petition for recoupment of costs here refers to the care for those 29 animals, which were later impounded. The Brambletts appealed that order, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the County's petition without providing notice under OCGA § 4-11-9.4. The appellate court disagreed, finding that the procedure in OCGA § 4-11-9.8 applied because the notice provisions of OCGA §§ 4-11-9.4 and 4-11-9.5 only apply when the animal has been impounded “under” or “pursuant to this article” of the Georgia Animal Protection Act. Here, the animals were seized under as part of an investigation of violations of OCGA § 16-12-4 so the notice provisions did not apply. As to defendants contention that the court erred by not considering the "actual predicted costs" of caring for 29 dogs and instead relying on a "formulaic calculation," the court also found no error. The judgment was affirmed.

Summary: This Georgia case involves a former police lieutenant who was indicted on two counts of aggravated cruelty to animals after he left his K-9 named Inka locked in his police vehicle while he attended to tasks inside his home. The dog died after being left inside the vehicle, which had all doors and windows closed with no A/C or ventilation running. The state appeals the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to quash the indictment. Specifically, the state argues that OCGA § 17-7-52 (a law that requires at least a 20-day notice prior to presentment of a proposed indictment to a grand jury when a peace officer is charged with a crime that occurred in the performance of his or her duties) is inapplicable. The state did not send defendant a copy of the proposed indictment before it presented the case to the grand jury. The state contends defendant "stepped aside" from his police-related duties and was therefore not afforded the protections of OCGA § 17-7-52. This court disagreed with that assessment. Since Peabody was responsible for the care and housing of Inka as her K-9 handler, leaving her unattended, albeit in an illegal manner, was still in performance of his police duties. As such, Peabody was entitled to the procedural protections of the statute according to the appellate court. The trial court's motion to quash his indictment was affirmed.