Elephants or Ivory

Summary: This report contains brief summaries of federal animal protection statutes, from the African Elephant Conservation Act to the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. While not including treaties, it does include statutes enacted to implement treaties. It includes statutes concerning animals that are not entirely, or not at all, animal protection statutes. For example, it includes a statute authorizing the eradication of predators, because one of the statute's purposes is to protect domestic and "game" animals; and it includes statutes to conserve fish, although their ultimate purpose may not be for the fishes' benefit. It also includes statutes that allow the disabled to use service animals, and even includes statutes aimed at acts of animal rights advocates. Among recent statutes included in the report are the 1992 and 1994 amendments to the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, section 404C of the Public Health Service Act, the 1994 amendments to the TwentyEight Hour Law, and the Wild Bird Conservation Act of 1992.

Summary: African elephants are poached for their ivory at alarming rates. If the current level of poaching continues, it is projected they will be extinct from the wild in the year 2025. Preserving the African elephant species is important from an animal rights, conservation, ecological, economical, and crime prevention perspective. The current penalties and fines for the illegal trade in ivory are not enough of a deterrent. One method of deterrence that has not yet been explored is the imposition of tax consequences on the illegal ivory trade. This Article proposes a number of ways to use the tax system to further deter participation in the illegal ivory trade. For tax purposes, illegal ivory should be treated similarly to other activities that have both legal and illegal operations, such as marijuana, gambling, and prostitution. Congress could impose an excise tax on ivory and an occupational tax on those who make or sell ivory products. In addition, there are several tax crimes in the Internal Revenue Code that are applicable to those who sell illegal ivory and do not report the income on their tax returns. For example, tax evasion is one of the related criminal activities associated with wildlife trafficking. Tax consequences will hopefully provide a further disincentive to those participating in the illegal ivory trade.

Summary: This Act prohibits commercial activities concerning ivory in the UK and the import and re-export of ivory for commercial purposes to and from the UK. This includes: buying, selling and hiring ivory; offering or arranging to buy, sell or hire ivory; keeping ivory for sale or hire; exporting ivory from, and importing ivory to the United Kingdom for sale or hire. Minor exemptions include: pre-1918 items of outstanding artistic etc value and importance; pre-1975 musical instruments; and acquisition of items by qualifying museums.

Summary: The Legislature passed Assembly Bill 96 which took effect July 1, 2016 as Fish & Game Code section 2022. The bill imposed new restrictions on the sale and importation of ivory and rhinoceros horn. The Ivory Education (the Institute) sued the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (the Department) in order to block implementation of the law. The institute alleged that the statute was unconstitutional on multiple grounds including vagueness, federal preemption, the takings clause, and the commerce clause. The trial court entered judgment for the Department and the intervenor defendants (the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Center for Biological Diversity, the Humane Society of the United States, the International Fund for Animal Welfare, and the Wildlife Conservation Society). The Institute appealed and abandoned all other issues raised and limited its challenge to the void-for-vagueness doctrine. "The Institute contend[ed] that section 2022 [was] unconstitutionally vague for two reasons: 1) while it allows for the sale or import of ivory insofar as it is allowed by federal law, differences in what federal law allows make it nearly impossible to tell what would qualify for the exemption provided by section 2022(c)(c); and 2) there are no guidelines by which to determine the permissible volume of ivory in either musical instruments or antiques." The Court of Appeals stated that a statute is not vague if its meaning can be determined by looking at other sources of information. Those who wish to comply with section 2022 have a duty to locate and examine statutes or whatever else necessary to determine the scope of the exemption provision. "Section 2022 has a single purpose—to prevent the sale or importation of ivory and rhinoceros horn. Both of those terms are defined. The Institute has 'not demonstrated that attempts to give substance and meaning' to the three disputed exceptions 'would be fruitless.'" As for the Institute's second contention, the Court of Appeals stated that because musical instruments and antiques are tangible objects that occupy a verifiable amount of three-dimensional space, the percentage of any such object that has ivory in it can be readily determined. The Court of Appeals held that the statute was not vague. The Court affirmed the holding of the trial court.

Summary: This Illinois law states that a person commits unlawful use of an elephant in a traveling animal act when he or she knowingly allows for the participation of an African elephant (Loxodonta Africana) or Asian elephant (Elephas maximus) protected under the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973 in a traveling animal act. Violation is a Class A misdemeanor. This Section does not apply to an exhibition of elephants at a non-mobile, permanent institution, or other facility.

Summary: This opinion concerns the City of New Bedford, Massachusetts' motion to dismiss plaintiff Rowley's (formerly plaintiff "Friends of Ruth & Emily, Inc.") citizen suit for injunction under the federal Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that two Asian Elephants, Ruth and Emily, were mistreated by the Buttonwood Park Zoo in New Bedford by chaining their legs, housing them in inadequate facilities, failing to provide proper socialization, and failing to provide adequate veterinary care, which gives rise to a "taking" under Section 9 of the ESA. Rowley claims that she is a member of the zoological society there and visits the elephants on a "near daily basis," resulting in “an aesthetic, emotional, and spiritual relationship with Ruth and Emily over the years.” The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asked both parties to brief on the issue of standing for the instant action. The court first noted that the ESA expressly authorizes citizen suits for injunctive relief. To survive a motion to dismiss, Rowley must, through facts, clearly demonstrate standing, and then the court must analyze those facts under a multi-pronged approach. To begin, the court distinguished cases that established the proper "animal nexus" for injury in fact with those that did not meet that finding. Here, Rowley's complaint established injury in fact because she lives in New Bedford, is a member of the Zoo's Zoological Society, and observes the elephants on a near daily basis. Rowley alleges that the maltreatment of Ruth and Emily injures this ability because she observes their ongoing suffering while in substandard captivity. The court was not persuaded by New Bedford's claim that Rowley has not established injury in fact because she has no specialized training in wildlife or animal welfare. In fact, this claim ignored precedent from this very circuit that "aesthetic injury" can be established by viewing animals in inhumane conditions. In addition, the court rejected New Bedford's "nonexistent requirement into the injury in fact analysis" that Rowley must have observed or will observe Asian elephants in their native habitats. As a result, the court found Rowley properly established injury in fact. As to the next requirement of causation, the court found that Rowley sufficiently alleged that the Zoo's actions caused the harm complained of for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss. Finally, as to redressability, the court found that Rowley's request for a declaratory judgment as to the Zoo's treatment of Ruth and Emily, and an injunction prohibiting the Zoo from euthanizing the elephants met this prong. New Bedford's contention that Rowley's further suggestion of moving the elephants to a sanctuary in Tennessee impaired her redressability argument because Rowley did not propose how the cost of relocation would be funded was also rejected. At this stage, the court does not need to determine whether this solution is necessary or feasible. The District Court ultimately held that Rowley demonstrated sufficient standing to pursue her claims. Hence, New Bedford's motion to dismiss was denied.

Summary: This paper addresses the catastrophic epidemic that is elephants infected with Tuberculosis, and the crisis that surrounds every diagnosis. Lack of Federal law and patchwork state laws makes it difficult, if not impossible, to control this pandemic. Moreover, inadequate testing for Tuberculosis in elephants is a safety hazard for elephants and humans. The lack of legal oversight and the absence of care by the agencies meant to protect elephants used for exhibition purposes is not only an animal welfare issue, but is a dire public safety concern.

Summary: This paper addresses the catastrophic epidemic that is elephants infected with Tuberculosis, and the crisis that surrounds every diagnosis. Lack of Federal law and patchwork state laws makes it difficult, if not impossible, to control this pandemic. Moreover, inadequate testing for Tuberculosis in elephants is a safety hazard for elephants and humans. The lack of legal oversight and the absence of care by the agencies meant to protect elephants used for exhibition purposes is not only an animal welfare issue, but is a dire public safety concern.

Summary: In this case the petitioner, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., sought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of three elephants, Beulah, Minnie, and Karen, which are owned by the respondents, R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc. and William R. Commerford, as president of R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc. The issue was whether the court should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus because the elephants are “persons” entitled to liberty and equality for the purposes of habeas corpus. The court denied the petition on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction (because the plaintiffs lacked standing) and the petition was wholly frivolous on its face in legal terms (elephants are not "persons" according to the court). The court he court dismissed the petition for writ of habeas, but pointed to the state's anti-cruelty laws "as a potential alternative method of ensuring the well-being of any animal."

Summary: This case dealt with an action brought by an organization of safari hunters and firearm advocacy association under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS), challenging the decision to suspend imports of sport-hunted African elephant trophies from Zimbabwe. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia entered summary judgment in FWS's favor, and the organization and association appealed. Under the ESA, sport-hunted African elephant trophies may only be imported into the United States if, among other things, the FWS makes “[a] determination ... that the killing of the trophy animal will enhance the survival of the species”. The Court of Appeals held that 1) FWS's interpretation of Special Rule forbidding import of sport-hunted elephant trophies was permissible; 2) FWS could base finding that killing of African elephants did not enhance species' survival on absence of evidence that sport hunting enhanced survival of species; 3) FWS's conclusion that it lacked evidence to make finding that killing African elephants in Zimbabwe would enhance survival of species rebutted any presumption that importation did not violate any provision of ESA or regulation issued pursuant to ESA; 4) removal of enhancement requirement from Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora did not require FWS to reconsider Special Rule; 5) finding constituted rule rather than adjudication; and 6) FWS's failure to engage in notice-and-comment prior to finding was not harmless error. Affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded so the FWS can initiate rule making to address enhancement findings for the time periods at issue in this case.