Primates

Summary: In Alaska, gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and gibbons are considered “game” animals which are regulated by the state’s Department of Fish and Game (DFG). In general, it is illegal to import and possess apes without a DFG permit.The following article begins with a general overview of the various state statutes and regulations affecting Great Apes. It then analyzes the applicability of those laws to the possession and use of apes for specific purposes, including their possession as pets, for scientific research, for commercial purposes, and in sanctuaries.

Summary: This article discusses the state laws that govern the import, possession, use, and treatment of Great Apes in Alabama. In Alabama, gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans and gibbons are considered “Class 1” wildlife, which means that they are among the most heavily regulated wild animals in the state. Although the possession and use of apes is heavily regulated in certain areas, such as display and exhibition, it is virtually unregulated in other areas. The following article begins with a general overview of the various state statutes and regulations affecting Great Apes. It then analyzes the applicability of those laws to the possession and use of apes for specific purposes, including their possession as pets, for scientific research, for commercial purposes, and in sanctuaries. The discussion concludes with a compilation of local ordinances which govern the possession and use of apes within geographic subdivisions of the state.

Summary: This case is an appeal from a Supreme Court judgment denying petitioner's application for an order to show cause to commence a CPLR article 70 proceeding. At issue is the legal status of a chimpanzee named Tommy who is being kept on respondents' property. Petitioners filed a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 on the ground that Tommy was being unlawfully detained by respondents. They offered support via affidavits of experts that chimpanzee have the requisite characteristics sufficient for a court to consider them "persons" to obtain personal autonomy and freedom from unlawful detention. The Court of Appeals here is presented with the novel question on whether a chimpanzee is a legal person entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus. In rejecting this designation, the Court relied on the fact that chimpanzees cannot bear any legal responsibilities or social duties. As such, the Court found it "inappropriate to confer upon chimpanzees the legal rights . . . that have been afforded to human beings."

Summary: This set of statutes outlines the procedures and penalties for violations of New York's Environmental Conservation Law.

Summary: The law assists in the conservation of great apes by supporting and providing financial resources for the conservation programs of countries within the range of great apes. Under the law, Great apes include the chimpanzee, gorilla, bonobo, orangutan, and gibbon. The law authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, through the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, to award grants to entities that will promote the conservation of great apes in the wild.

Summary: This 2013 Act prohibits the importing, possession, selling, or breeding of apes, baboons, and macques. It is unlawful under the act for a person to allow a member of the public to come into direct contact with a primate. Further, a person cannot tether a primate outdoors or allow a primate to run at-large. The section does not apply to accredited AZA institutions, AWA regulated research facilities, wildlife sanctuaries, temporary holding facilities, licensed veterinarians providing treatment, law enforcement officers, circuses holding AWA Class C licenses as provided, and those temporarily in the state. The act has a grandfathering provision that allows a person at least 18 years of age to continue to possess the restricted primate if within 180 days after the effective date of the act the person registers the animal per § 20-19-605 and follows other listed requirements.

Summary:

A nonprofit corporation petitioned the trial court for injunctive and declaratory relief regarding fees charged by a state university primate research center for document inspection.  The circuit court dismissed the action with prejudice, reasoning it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the fee issue and, assuming jurisdiction existed, the fees were in compliance with law.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding the circuit court had jurisdiction to review the basis, reasonableness and amount of fees charged by the university.

Summary:

The New York appellate court held that the dangerousness or viciousness of plaintiff’s pet monkey was irrelevant, and that the city could remove the monkey regardless of its benevolent behavior.

Summary:

In this Nevada case, respondent Berosini claimed that two animal rights organizations, PETA and Performing Animal Welfare Society (PAWS), and three individuals defamed him and invaded his privacy. The trial court entered judgment on jury verdicts on the libel and invasion of privacy claims in the aggregate amount of $4.2 million. On appeal, this Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict and reversed the judgment. The court found that the videotapes of Berosini beating his animal performers before the show was not libelous because they were not false or defamatory. The videotape was not “false” because it was an accurate portrayal of the manner in which Berosini disciplined his animals backstage before performances and it was not not defamatory because Berosini took the position that the shaking, punching, and beating that appear on the tape were necessary, appropriate and “justified” for the training, discipline, and control of show animals. With regard to his invasion of privacy claims, the videotaping did not invade the scope of Berosini's expectation of privacy because his asserted expectation was "freedom from distracting intrusion and interference with his animals and his pre-act disciplinary procedures." Thus, the filming did not intrude upon Berosini's expected seclusion.

Summary:

Maryland Court of Appeals held that animal-cruelty statute did not apply to researchers because there are certain normal human activities to which the infliction of pain to an animal is purely incidental and unavoidable.