Deer

Summary: These sections regulate the selling of deer meat and other parts of the deer, namely the skin, hide and head. Once a deer has been legally taken, the code allows the skin or hide to be sold, purchased, tanned, or manufactured into articles for sale. There is also a provision which prohibits the capturing or destroying of any deer and detaching or removing from the carcass only the head, hide, antlers, or horn. This same section also forbids any person from leaving through carelessness or neglect any game mammal or game bird which is in his possession, or any portion of the flesh thereof usually eaten by humans, to go needlessly to waste.

Summary: These two sections govern archery deer hunting in California. Archery hunting is done with a bow and arrow and hunters which participate in this type of hunting are restricted from carrying a firearm.

Summary: Under this California law, it is unlawful for any person to possess, transport, import, export, propagate, purchase, sell, or transfer any live mammal for the purposes of maiming, injuring, or killing the mammal for gain, amusement, or sport.

Summary: This Alaska statute provides that any dog that habitually annoys any wild deer, reindeer, sheep, cattle, horse, or other animal or bird either domestic or wild, or evinces a disposition which makes it likely that it will without provocation bite an animal or fowl, may be lawfully killed by any person when it is found at large. The owner or keeper of the dog, if known or reasonably identifiable, shall be notified and given reasonable opportunity to restrain the dog before it is lawful to kill it.

Summary: This section of the AWA prohibits shelters from selling found pets within a period of five days to any random-source organization. The purpose of the Act is to prevent animals from being stolen and purchased from humane societies in order to use the animals for scientific testing or illegal purposes (such as fighting, etc.).

Summary:

Defendants Rory and Robby Kuenzi charged a herd of 30 to 40 deer with their snowmobiles, cruelly killing four by running them over, dragging them, and leaving one tied to a tree to die. The two men were charged with a Class I felony under Wisconsin § 951.02, which prohibits any person from “treat[ing] any animal ... in a cruel manner.” The Court concluded that the definition of “animal” included non-captive wild animals and rejected the defendants’ argument that they were engaged in “hunting.” The court reinstated the charges against the men.

Summary:

Defendant shot and killed two hunting dogs, estimated to be worth $5,000 to $8,000 each, who were chasing deer across his property. The defendant was later convicted by the jury under the first degree malicious mischief felony for “knowingly and maliciously ... [causing] physical damage to the property of another in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars.”  On appeal, the court upheld the jury’s conviction because the defendant had no right to kill the dogs chasing deer across his property and because the prosecution was allowed to charge under the first degree malicious mischief felony for “knowingly and maliciously ... [causing] physical damage to the property of another in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars.”

Summary:

The owner of severely damaged orchards was convicted for shooting some of the responsible animals after repeated requests for state remedies were unsuccessful. The damage to defendant's orchard (with estimated losses of over $200,000 for future cherry production) occurred in 1998 and 1999, when herds of elk repeatedly came through inadequate fencing constructed by the State. The Supreme Court held that when a property owner charged with unlawful hunting or waste of wildlife presents sufficient evidence that he exercised his constitutional right to protect his property from destructive game, the burden shifts to the State to disprove this justification. In this case, the defendant was denied jury instructions regarding his constitutional right to reasonably protect his property.

Summary:

In this Utah case, the State sought review of the court of appeals' decision vacating the convictions of defendants. Reber was convicted of aiding or assisting in the wanton destruction of protected wildlife in violation of state law for killing a mule deer without a license or permit. On appeal, defendant contended that the state had no jurisdiction because he was an Indian hunting in Indian country. However, the court held that the State has jurisdiction over these defendants because the State has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country when a non-Indian commits a victimless crime. Defendants are not Indians, as that term has been defined by federal law, and the crimes in these cases were victimless.

Summary:

A Pennsylvania association consisting of hunters and outdoorsmen and members of the association filed a complaint/request for writ of mandamus against the Pennsylvania Game Commission, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR), and various state officials, seeking an order directing Commission and DCNR to provide the data and information on which the Commission relied in setting "harvest" figures for Pennsylvania's deer population. Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Game Commission , the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and certain Commonwealth officers (collectively, Respondents). The court first found that the Sportsmen indeed have standing, conferred both by statute and under the under the traditional substantial-direct-immediate test. However, Respondent Game Commission's demurrer was sustained, primarily because the court agreed that due to the ambiguous nature of Sportsmen's pleading, it is not possible to discern a legal theory to support the relief requested. Further, the court sustained Respondent's claim that the DCNR, its Secretary, and the state's Governor were not proper parties to association's suit. Despite these procedural defects, the court did not dismiss the Sportsmen's action, and instead allowed them to amend their complaint within 30 days of this order.