Deer

Summary: Appellant Stefanowicz appeals from the judgment entered in the Tioga County Court of Common Pleas in Pennsylvania. Appellant and his wife co-owned a deer farm ("Awesome Whitetails") where they are legally licensed to operate and sell trophy bucks which are kept in a fenced-in enclosure on their property. Appellant's neighbor, Ms. Smith, owned two German Shepherd dogs, which Appellant testified frequently entered his property and had previously harassed the animals he raises there. Appellant and his wife submitted a complaint to the state dog warden who then warned Smith of the statewide requirements on confining dogs. The warden also advised Appellant of the legal right to kill a dog that is “in the act of pursuing or wounding or killing” Appellant's animals. In fall of 2020, Smith's dogs entered Appellant's property and were chasing the deer from outside the fence. This deer began to panic, causing one to get stuck in the fence where one of the dogs then stared biting it. Appellant tried to yell at the dogs to no avail, so he then shot and killed the dogs. Appellant testified that one deer had a bloody gash, two more had bloody faces, and one deer died of a broken neck. Ultimately, Smith was sent a citation for failing to confine the dogs and Appellant was charged with two counts of Aggravated Cruelty to Animals and convicted of one of those counts. On appeal, Appellant raises several issues. The first two issues challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for the Aggravated Cruelty conviction. The court found sufficient evidence for the conviction as Appellant acted in an intentional manner to kill the dogs. Next, Appellant asserts that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because of his legal defense. In Pennsylvania, it is legal to kill certain dogs in the act of pursuing or wounding "domestic animals" (which includes farm-raised deer). The trial judge here gave an instruction on the defense, but added that "under the laws of this Commonwealth, harassing an animal through a fence without any contact does not constitute pursuing, wounding, or killing an animal." Here, the jury heard that instruction and found the defense inapplicable for one dog. There was testimony from Appellant that he saw one of the two dogs biting a deer caught in the fence, not both dogs. Since the jury was free to evaluate the testimony and infer guilt, the reviewing court will not disturb the lower court's determination. After disposing of the remaining issues related to jury selection and ineffective assistance of counsel, the court affirmed Appellant's sentence.

Summary: This West Virginia law enacted in 2020 provides that a person who is legally hunting and reasonably believes he or she has mortally wounded a deer or bear may use leashed dogs to track and locate the mortally wounded deer or bear. The hunter is also permitted to use a dog handler of leashed dogs to track and locate the mortally wounded deer or bear. The hunter or the dog handler shall maintain physical control of the leashed dogs at all times.

Summary: This Connecticut law relates to the regulation of in-state captive herds of cervids, including reindeer. Under the law, not later than November 1, 2012, the Commissioner of Agriculture shall implement a pilot program for the issuance of two permits that allow not more than two Connecticut businesses to maintain not more than five reindeer each.

Summary: This case concerns the regulatory authority of the Missouri Conservation Commission ("Commission"), which has authority over the control, management, restoration, conservation, and regulation of the bird, fish, game, forestry and all wildlife resources of the state. The respondents in this case operate different selective breeding and private hunting facilities that rely on captive bred deer and elk (“cervids”). Respondent Hill co-owns the Oak Creek Whitetail Ranch which is a large hunting preserve and white-tailed deer breeding operation. Respondent Broadway owns a hunting preserve which offers three-day guided hunts of a variety of animals, including elk. Broadway also has a deer breeding operation. Respondent Grace owns a breeding facility for white-tailed deer, sika, and red deer. The respondents cannot operate their hunting preserves and captive breeding facilities without permits from the Missouri Department of Conservation, which all respondents have. Cervids can be infected with a fatal neurodegenerative disease known as chronic wasting disease (CWD). The first detection of the disease in Missouri was at Heartland Wildlife Ranches, which was eventually purchased by Respondent Broadway and renamed Winter Quarters Wildlife Ranch. Due to this, the Missouri Conservation Commission set up surveillance within 25 miles of the facility. From 2010 to 2013 the Commission found 10 free-ranging deer infected with CWD out of the 14,000 tested in the surveillance zone. Over the next three years the Commission detected CWD in 14 free-ranging deer, several of which were found near closed or currently operating captive cervid facilities. Attempting to eradicate CWD, the Commission proposed a series of regulatory amendments that were to take effect in January of 2015. The amendments were aimed at the captive cervid industry. The regulations relevant to this case banned the importation of cervids, imposed more rigorous fencing requirements, and imposed more rigorous recordkeeping and veterinary inspection requirements. Respondents brought an action suing the Appellants (the Missouri Conservation Commission) to prevent these regulations from going into effect. At trial, the circuit court declared that the regulations were invalid and enjoined the Commission from enforcing them. On appeal, the Commission raised three arguments. First, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred because Respondents’ cervids are “game” and “wildlife resources of the state” and, therefore, can be regulated by the Commission under the Missouri Constitution. Second, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred because the Commission’s authority to promulgate the regulations does not implicate or infringe on the Respondents’ rights to farm. Third, the Commission contends that the circuit court erred by enjoining the Commission’s enforcement of the new regulations against all people in Missouri, rather than only against the Respondents. The Respondents contend that captive cervids are not wildlife or game even though they are wild by nature because they are too domesticated and, therefore, akin to livestock. The Court rejects this contention and looks at the plain meaning of the terms “game” and “wildlife” and concludes that both terms plainly include all species that are wild by nature. The terms are not ambiguous. The Court points out that it would be unreasonable to hold that the Commission has constitutional authority to regulate individual cervids that are born free and still free-roaming but take away that authority when an individual cervid is considered domesticated. “The Court will not give a law a construction which would render it unreasonable when it is susceptible to a reasonable one.” Furthermore, historically, the term “game” was broad enough to embrace all kinds of deer whether tame or wild. Captive cervids are therefore considered “game” and “wildlife” and the Commission has authority under the Missouri Constitution to regulate Respondents’ captive cervids. Respondent’ second contention is that they own the captive cervids and, therefore, the cervids are not resources of the state. The Court rejects this contention. The Commission has always regulated deer and elk owned by private parties. The Court holds that the phrase “resources of the state” unambiguously refers to resources within the entire geographical boundaries of the state. Therefore, Respondents’ cervids are considered resources of the state. The Court agrees with the Commission’s second contention that the regulations did not infringe on Respondents’ right to farm. Respondents failed to show that they are engaged in farming and ranching practices and, therefore, cannot invoke the guarantee of the Missouri Constitution. The Court did not reach the Commission’s third contention. Ultimately the Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Respondents and entered judgment in favor of Appellants on both counts.

Summary: Ley Nº 24.702 establishes that various species of andean deer will be declared natural monuments. This species correspond to: Hippocamelus bisulcus (huemul, güemul or guamul (araucano); shoan, shoam or shonen (tehuelche), Andean deer, southern huemul, trula or trulá, Chilean huemul, hueque, deer (southern Patagonia) and Hippocamelus antisensis (tarusch, taruga, taruka or chacu (quichua), deer, northern or northern huemul, huemul, fallow deer, cerrero deer, huemul cordillerano, huemul peruano, peñera). Ley Nº 24.702, also instructs the National Park Administration and the Directorate of Wildlife and Flora of the Nation to work together on the management plan for the species in the areas of its jurisdiction, making sure it is in accordance to the national faunal policy.

Summary: This Act makes it a an offence to take or intentionally kill certain deer during the closed season, and to kill any deer at night (with exceptions). Various methods used to take or kill deer are also prohibited.

Summary: This South Dakota statute states that if any deer or antelope is killed by a motor vehicle on a public highway, the person who desires to possess that animal shall notify a conservation officer. The conservation officer may give a dated and written authorization allowing possession of the animal at no fee. However, no part of an animal so obtained may be sold, bartered, or traded.

Summary: Any person driving a motor vehicle who collides with a deer or bear may, upon compliance with relevant provisions, keep the deer or bear for his or her own use. The person shall immediately report the accident to a conservation police officer or other law-enforcement officer. If the officer believes that the deer or bear was killed by the collision, he shall award the animal to the person claiming the deer or bear, and shall give the person a certificate to that effect.

Summary: Appellee established a business that allowed for "high fence" hunting, which refers to hunting wild animals on property that is enclosed by a fence, of privately-owned whitetail deer. The pivotal question in this appeals case was whether the Indiana Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) was correct in asserting that the current statutory scheme prohibited this practice, and therefore allowed the agency to promulgate rules effectuating that prohibition. The Indiana Court of Appeals held that IDNR did not have the power to regulate fish and wildlife that were legally owned or held in captivity under a license. The IDNR therefore went beyond its express powers conferred upon it by the General Assembly when it promulgated rules that prohibited "high fence" hunting. The lower court's grant of summary judgment to the appellee was affirmed.

Summary:

This treaty applies to animals kept for farming purposes. It outlines the keeping, caring for and housing of farm animals on the farm and especially in modern stock farming systems. Freedom of movement is especially important for animals kept in these systems as well as appropriate lighting, ventilation, temperature and environmental conditions