Dogs

Bolivia - Dangerous dog - LEY Nº 553 , 2014

Summary: This law contains the legal framework that establishes the minimum legal conditions for the possession of dangerous dogs. The purpose of this law is to prevent aggression against people and their property by prohibiting the possession of dangerous dogs. Possession of dangerous dogs is allowed with prior authorization, obtaining a license, and compliance with safety measures established in this law.

T. , J. A. s/ infracción Ley 14.346

Summary: The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court that sentenced the Defendant to eleven months of imprisonment after finding him criminally responsible for acts of cruelty in violation of Article 1 of Ley 14.346 against a stray dog. The Defendant was found guilty of sexually abusing a dog, who he forced into his premises. The dog’s genital area was sheared and she had serious injuries, which the veterinarian concluded were clear signs of penetration. The Supreme Court referred to the Chamber of Appeals on Criminal Matters of Parana "B.J.L. s/ infracción a la Ley 14.346", of October 1, 2003, where the referred court stated that “the norms of Ley 14.346 protect animals against acts of cruelty and mistreatment, is not based on mercy, but on the legal recognition of a framework of rights for other species that must be preserved, not only from predation, but also from treatment that is incompatible with the minimum rationality." Further, "the definition of ‘person’ also includes in our pluralistic and anonymous societies a rational way of contact with animals that excludes cruel or degrading treatment."

Incidente de apelación en autos G. B., R. s/inf. ley 14346

Summary: This is an appeal of a decision in first instance where the lower court gave the custody of 68 dogs to the Center for Prevention of Animal Cruelty. The 68 dogs were found in extremely poor conditions, sick, malnourished, dehydrated under the custody of the Defendant. Various dogs had dermatitis, conjunctivitis, otitis, sparse hair and boils, lacerations, pyoderma and ulcers. The officers that executed the search also found the decomposing body of a dead dog inside the premises. The lower court determined the defendant had mental disabilities, which did not allow her to comprehend the scope of her acts, for which she was not found guilty of animal cruelty. However, the court determined that she was not suited to care for the dogs. The Defendant appealed the decision arguing that the authorities were not entitled to seize the animals.

NV - Research - 574.205. Requirement to offer dog or cat for adoption before euthanization; immunity from civil liability

Summary: This Nevada law, enacted in 2015, mandates that a research facility that intends to euthanize a dog or cat for any purpose other than scientific, medical or educational research shall, before euthanizing the dog or cat, offer the dog or cat for adoption if the dog or cat is appropriate for adoption. This adoption may be completed through an adoption program of the research facility or through a collaborative agreement with an animal rescue organization.

IL - Research - Act 93. Research Dogs and Cats Adoption Act

Summary: This act, effective January 1, 2018, is entitled the Research Dogs and Cats Adoption Act. Under the act, a research facility shall assess the health of a dog or cat used in research and then make reasonable efforts to offer for adoption a dog or cat determined to be suitable for adoption, either through private placement or through an animal adoption organization. The research facility must have a facility adoption policy that is made available on its website.

Davison v. Berg

Summary: Deborah Davison volunteered at her local Humane Society to help take care of a dog park. Three years later, Rebecca Berg’s dog who was chasing other dogs collided with Davison. Davison suffered a broken leg that required extensive medical care. Davison then filed an action against Berg under a Florida statute that “imposes liability on dog owners for damage their dogs cause to other persons and animals.” The trial court granted final summary judgment in favor of Berg for two reasons. The first reason was that the signs outside of the park sufficiently warned Davison of the risks of injury inside. The second reason was that Davison essentially consented to the risk of potential injuries by being a volunteer for the dog park. On appeal, this court stated that the Florida statute was a strict liability statute that makes an owner the insurer of their dog’s conduct. The only defense to the statute is for an owner to display in a prominent place on his or her premises a sign that includes the words “Bad Dog.” Berg presented evidence that the park had two signs prominently displayed at the entrance to the park with the title “Dog Park Rules.” The two signs listed rules for entrance to the dog park. One of these rules stated that park use is at the dog owner’s risk. Another rule stated that rough play and chasing were not allowed if any dogs or owners were uncomfortable with that behavior. The last rule stated that visitors enter at their own risk. Even though Davison entered the park at her own risk, the purpose of the sign requirement in the statute was to give notice that a bad dog is on the premises. The Court found that the trial court erred in finding that the signs at the dog park were sufficiently equivalent to “Bad Dog” signs to preclude liability under the Florida statute. The trial court also found that by virtue of Davison volunteering at the dog park, she was aware that she could be injured during the course of her work and that she signed a volunteer application form that acknowledged that she could be exposed to “bites, scratches, and other injuries.” Davison had also witnessed a prior collision between a dog and an individual that resulted in a broken leg. After witnessing that, Davison began to warn others at the Humane Society about the dangers of being inside the dog park with dogs chasing each other. The Court held that even though there may be evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Davison consented to the risk of injury, “an actual consent or assumption of the risk defense cannot bar liability.” The Court reversed the trial court’s entry of final summary judgment in favor of Berg.

TN - Dog, dangerous, felon - § 39-17-1363. Violent felony conviction; custody or control of dogs; application

Summary: Under this Tennessee law, it is an offense for any person convicted of a violent felony to knowingly own, possess, have custody or control of a potentially vicious dog or a vicious dog for a period of ten years after such person has been released from custody following completion of sentence. Additionally, it is an offense for any convicted violent felon to own or have custody of a dog that is not microchipped or spayed/neutered. This section shall only apply if a person's conviction for a violent felony occurs on or after July 1, 2010.

CA - Import, dog - Chapter 1.5. Dog Importation: Health Certificates

Summary: This chapter relates to importation of dogs into California for sale purposes. A person seeking to bring a dog into this state or importing dogs into this state for the purpose of resale or change of ownership shall obtain a health certificate for that dog, completed by a licensed veterinarian and is dated within 10 days prior to the date on which the dog is brought into the state. However, this chapter does not apply to a person who brings a dog into the state that will not be offered for resale or if the ownership of the dog is not expected to change or to dogs used military or law enforcement work. A person who violates a provision of this chapter is guilty of an infraction, punishable by a fine not to exceed $250 for each dog for which a violation has occurred.

MN - Restaurants - 157.175. Dogs; outdoor food and beverage service establishments

Summary: This Minnesota law allows a statutory or home rule charter city to adopt an ordinance permitting food and beverage service establishments to allow dogs to accompany persons patronizing designated outdoor areas. The law describes the permitting process that establishments must first undergo. At a minimum, the ordinance must include the following five requirements, which must be posted conspicuously on a sign at the premises: (1) employees must be prohibited from touching, petting, or otherwise handling dogs; (2) employees and patrons must not allow dogs to come into contact with serving dishes, utensils, tableware, linens, paper products, or any other items involved in food service operations; (3) patrons must keep their dogs on a leash at all times and must keep their dogs under reasonable control; (4) dogs must not be allowed on chairs, tables, or other furnishings; and (5) dog waste must be cleaned immediately and the area sanitized.

People v. Robards

Summary: This case is an appeal from an animal cruelty conviction against defendant Ms. Regina Robards. She seeks appeal on the grounds that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Robards was charged with aggravated animal cruelty when her two dogs, Walker and Sparky, were discovered in her previous home emaciated, dehydrated, and dead. She had moved out of the home and into Ms. Joachim’s home in July 2014, telling Joachim that she was arranging for the dogs to be taken care of. However, when Joachim went over to the prior home in November 2014, she discovered Walker’s emaciated body on the living room floor. She called the police, who discovered Sparky’s body in a garbage bag in the bedroom. Robards’ conviction required that it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that she intentionally committed an act that caused serious injury or death to her two dogs, and failing to seek adequate medical care for them. On appeal, Robards concedes that the dogs both died from dehydration and starvation, and that she was the only person responsible for the dogs’ care. However, she argues that for her conviction to stand, the prosecutor must prove that she intended to cause serious injury or death to the dogs. The court disagrees, stating that for conviction only the act need be intentional, and that the act caused the death or serious injury of an animal. Notably, the court observed that "defendant is very fortunate to have only received a sentence of 12 months' probation for these heinous crimes," and criticized the circuit court for its "unjustly and inexplicably lenient" sentence simply because defendant only caused harm to an animal and not a human being.