Dogs

Summary: This Act requires a license from the West Virginia Racing Commission in order to conduct horse or dog racing. Anyone who participates or has anything to do with dog racing or horse racing at a licensed track, such as employees and horse/dog owners, must have a permit from the commission. This Act allows for the West Virginia Racing Commission to continue its existence as a public corporation. The Commission has full jurisdiction over and must supervise all horse and dog race meetings and all persons involved in the holding or conducting of horse and dog race meetings. Each county that already permits horse racing must vote and approve dog racing in order for the Commission to issue a license for a racing facility.

Summary: This Vermont law, effective January of 2019, states that a person who incidentally traps a dog or cat shall notify a fish and wildlife warden or the Department within 24 hours after discovery of the trapped dog or cat. The Department shall maintain records of all reports of incidentally trapped dogs or cats submitted under this section, and the reports shall include the disposition of each incidentally trapped dog or cat.

Summary: This set of statutes allows for municipalities in Alabama to vote on whether or not they wish to authorize horse and greyhound racing and pari-mutuel wagering. Each municipality that authorizes it must create a commission which must be incorporated in order for a municipality to conduct horse and greyhound racing. The commissions each regulate horse and greyhound racing only in their respective municipalities. A license must be obtained by the commission of the respective municipality in which one desires to operate or construct a racing facility.

Summary: This Maryland statute provides that a research facility located in the State in which dogs or cats are used for scientific research purposes shall take reasonable steps to provide for the adoption of a dog or cat after a determination that the animal is no longer needed for research. This shall be done through a private placement process for adoption, establishing a list of animal rescues willing to take in these animals, or offering a dog or cat to the rescues.

Summary: This chapter, adopted in 2018, is the “Research Animal Retirement Act." A higher education research facility that receives public money must assess the health of a cat or dog to determine whether it is suitable for adoption once any testing or research on the animal has been completed. The facility must then make reasonable efforts to place those suitable dogs or cats through private adoption or adoption through a shelter or rescue. These efforts shall be made prior to euthanizing the dog or cat.

Summary: The purpose of this subchapter is to ensure that healthy cats and dogs that are no longer needed for research, education, testing, or other scientific purposes are made available for adoption instead of euthanized and to create a process for adoption through agreements with local shelters or rescue groups. When a research facility no longer needs a cat or dog that does not pose a health or safety risk to the public, the research facility shall either offer the animal to a rescue organization or shelter for adoption or offer it for adoption through private placement.

Summary: This Georgia involves an interlocutory appeal arising from a dog bite lawsuit. In 2016, Plaintiff Saulsbury was walking her English Bulldog past Defendant Wilson's house when Wilson's pitbull dog escaped its crate in the open garage. A fight ensued between the dogs. Wilson then attempted to break up the fight and was allegedly bitten by Saulsbury's dog, suffering a broken arm in the process and necessitating a course of rabies shots. The Saulsburys then sued the Wilsons in magistrate court to recover hospital and veterinary expenses. Wilson counterclaimed for her injuries in excess $15,000, thus transferring the case to superior court. At this time, the Saulsburys moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals here reverses that denial. The court found that Wilson assumed the risk when she intervened in a dog fight with her bare hands. In particular, the court observed that assumption of risk serves as a complete defense to negligence. That finding was bolstered by the fact that Wilson had knowledge that her dog had previously bitten other persons and had admitted to breaking up previous dog fights with a stick. The court relied on previous case law showing that all animals, even domesticated animals, pose a risk as does the act of breaking up even human fights. The court was not persuaded by the fact that Saulsbury may have been in violation of various DeKalb County ordinances related to an owner's responsibility to control his or her animal. A plain reading of those ordinances does not impose a duty on the part of an owner to "dangerously insert herself into a dog fight." The court found the lower court erred in denying the Saulsbury's motion for summary judgment and reversed and remanded the case.

Summary: Misty Wyno was attacked and killed by a neighbor’s dog. Her husband, Jason Wyno brought a wrongful death action against the dog’s owners, Lowndes County, and four individual Lowndes County Animal Control employees. Jason alleged that Lowndes County and the County Employees negligently failed to perform ministerial duties, negligently failed to provide police protection, negligently created and failed to abate a nuisance, were negligent in their control of allegedly dangerous dogs, and were negligent per se by violating several provisions of the Lowndes County Animal Control Ordinance. Jason also alleged that the County Employees acted with actual malice and/or an intent to injure by repeatedly refusing to investigate or take any action with regards to the dangerous dogs. Lowndes County asserted sovereign immunity as a defense for both itself and its employees. In addition, Lowndes County and the County Employees asserted that they were immune from liability due to the provisions of the Dangerous Dog Control Law in effect at the time. The trial court dismissed the suit against the employees in their individual capacities finding that the Dangerous Dog Control Law barred an action against any party except the dog’s owners. The Supreme Court of Georgia ultimately held that the record was devoid of any evidence that any of the County Employees acted with malice or the intent to harm Jason or Misty Wyno to defeat official immunity. Jason, therefore, did not satisfy his burden and the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Summary: Cathie Iris Warren was convicted of three felony counts of aggravated animal cruelty, five felony counts of aggravated cruelty, and a misdemeanor cruelty to animals count. Warren appealed contending that the district court erred by denying Warren’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of her commercial kennel property, denying Warren’s Baston challenge, and in imposing costs to be reimbursed by Warren under Montana law. Cathie Iris Warren operated a kennel on her residential property in Libby, Montana. Warren obtained her initial license to operate her business in 2013. In 2016 it was discovered that Warren was operating her kennel despite the fact that her business license had expired in October of 2015. In order to obtain a new license, Warren needed to have an inspection of her property. Warren ended up having three separate inspections of her property. After each inspection, Warren had failed to meet the requirements. The members of the Health Department who were involved in the inspections became concerned that the animals were not being adequately cared for and were not of good health. Warren could not provide appropriate vaccination records for all of her animals. A search warrant was executed on Warren’s property on August 2, 2016. Warren’s animals were seized the same day. Warren moved to suppress the evidence that was obtained arguing that a warrant was required for each inspection that had been conducted on her property. The court concluded that there was no search because Warren did not have an expectation of privacy in her commercial kennel operation that society would consider objectively reasonable. The trial court convicted Warren and found that Warren owed statutorily-imposed costs, including veterinary care, food and supplies, excess hours worked by county employees, and travel costs as well as the shelter’s lost revenue. Warren appealed her conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court of Montana found that Warren treated parts of her home as part of her kennel, therefore, those areas of her home that were searched were considered commercial property which is subject to a less significant expectation of privacy. The Court concluded that the administrative inspection fell within the applicable warrant exception, was reasonable, and did not require a search warrant. Warren also challenged the State’s peremptory challenge of a minority juror (Baston Challenge). The Court concluded that the District Court reached the right conclusion on the Baston challenge but for the wrong reason. Warren’s third challenge was whether the District Court erred in calculating the statutory costs owed by Warren. The Court found that the costs approved by the District Court were reasonably supported by the evidence. The Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the District Court.

Summary: This act legalizes and only applies to pari-mutuel wagering on dog and horse races in the state of Iowa. The act creates a state racing and gaming commission which has full jurisdiction to investigate applicants, adopt standards, and regulate all horse and dog races governed by the act. Organizations that wish to conduct horse and dog racing must apply to the commission for a license and meet the requirements. Tracks that are licensed to race dogs are required to maintain a racing dog adoption program.