Cattle

Summary: The Act, specific to the North Indian state of Haryana, prohibits cow slaughter. A cow may be slaughtered only under certain conditions, and a person slaughtering a cow under these conditions must obtain a certificate from a registered veterinary practitioner. Cows cannot be exported for slaughter. Persons may not sell, store, keep or transport beef or beef products. The Act provides for the creation of a scheme or project for the conservation of indigenous breeds of cow. The Government must establish and maintain institutions to look after infirm, stray and 'uneconomic' cows. An offence under this Act carried with it imprisonment and fines.

Summary: The Act, specific to the western Indian state of Gujarat, prohibits the slaughter of cattle. A person transporting cattle from one region or the state to another is deemed to be transporting them for slaughter unless they are able to prove otherwise. Persons are prohibited from selling, storing, transporting or offering for sale beef or beef products. Animals other than cattle may be slaughtered, but may be slaughtered only after a certificate is issued by the Competent Authority. Offences under this Act are cognizable—this means that offenders may be arrested without a warrant. Offences under this Act carry with them imprisonment or fines.

Summary: This provision, specific to the regions of Goa, Daman and Diu, prohibits the slaughter of cows. However, it does not prohibit the import of cow meat into these regions. Only cows that are suffering or are the subject of medical research may be slaughtered. In these cases, prior permission to slaughter the cow must be obtained by a veterinary officer or officer of the Animal Husbandry Department. Beef may not be sold in these regions. The government or local authority must maintain institutions for the care of 'uneconomic' cows. Offences under this Act are cognizable (offender can be arrested without a warrant) and non-bailable (bail is not a matter of right).

Summary: Killing, poisoning, maiming, or 'rendering useless' cattle, including elephants, or any other animal worth over fifty rupees, is a criminal offence.

Summary: Joshua Pernat and Sara Manzke owned property that had four miniature goats and two geese on it. Sara (plaintiff) applied for a zoning variance and a conditional use permit to accommodate her emotional support animals. Jefferson County and the Town of Ixonia denied her applications. Sara then brought forth claims under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and Wisconsin’s Open Housing Act that she was discriminated against by Jefferson County and the Town of Ixonia. Joshua and Sara also sought a notice of removal of a small claims action brought forth by Jefferson County seeking monetary sanctions for the alleged violations of the zoning variance. Jefferson County argued that the plaintiff’s federal reasonable accommodation claim was not ripe because the County never made a final decision with respect to Sara’s applications for a variance and conditional use permit. When the Town of Ixonia voted to recommend that Jefferson County deny the plaintiff’s variance application, the plaintiff withdrew her applications from consideration. Sara argued that the town’s denial “foretold a denial by the County,” and any further appeal to the County would have been fruitless. The Court did not agree. The County had no obligation to follow the town’s recommendation. The Court dismissed plaintiff’s Fair Housing Amendments Act claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and accordingly dismissed plaintiff’s state law claim without prejudice. Since Sara was unable to state a federal claim, the Court also held that Sara and Joshua could not remove the small claim by Jefferson County to federal court.

Summary: This law states that any person who has a special ownership in any horses, mules, cattle, or other stock killed or wounded by any railroad trains running in this state may sue the company running the trains for the damages within 12 months of the injury.

Summary: Animals raised for food or food production in the United States are, in large part, excluded from legal protection against cruelty. This article describes the minimal state and federal laws relating to such animals and documents numerous recent amendments to state anticruelty statutes that have placed the definition of cruelty to farm animals in the hands of the farming community. Mr. Wolfson argues that these amendments contradict the historical purpose of anticruelty statutes originally enacted to protect farm animals. The article also contrasts this regressive legal development with progressive European legislation. Finally, Mr. Wolfson outlines a path for reform.

Summary: Harley Smith worked for Meyring Cattle Company. Smith was injured when a herd dog allegedly nipped at the hoof of one of the cows and the cow charged forward trampling Smith. Smith sustained substantive injuries. Smith sued Meyring under negligence theories and under strict liability as set forth under Nebraska law. The district court found for Meyring. Smith appealed asserting that the district court erred by finding as a matter of law that strict liability did not apply to the facts of the case and for granting Meyring’s motion for partial directed verdict. as matter of first impression, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated that the element that a dog be vicious or have dangerous propensities is implicitly part of the strict liability statute. The Court concluded that there was no evidence that the herd dog bit, worried, or chased Smith. There was also no evidence that the herd dog’s actions were directed toward Smith. The language of the strict liability statute was never understood as encompassing bodily hurt to a person by way of a dog worrying or chasing “any sheep or other domestic animals” that collided with that person. The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Summary: In 2012, Iowa passed a statute (Iowa code § 717A.3A) that criminalized gaining access to agricultural facilities under false pretenses and making a false representation on a job application for those facilities. Plaintiffs in this case (animal rights groups including the Animal Legal Defense Fund and PETA) brought suit alleging that the statute was unconstitutional and sought to enjoin the Defendants (governor of Iowa) from enforcing it. Their complaint alleged that the statute violates the First Amendment as discrimination on the basis of content, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by targeting animals rights groups, and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by burdening the freedom of speech. This case decides the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ complaint based on lack of standing and failure to state a claim because the outlawed conduct is not protected by the First Amendment as false statements and is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting private property, thereby not violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denies Defendants' motion with respect to the First Amendment, concluding that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the intent to suppress their message because of their viewpoint. However, the court grants the motion to dismiss for the claim of a Fourteenth Amendment violation because the statute in fact serves a legitimate government purpose in protecting private property.

Summary: Sentencia C-041 is one of the most important court decisions on bullfighting. On this occasion, the court held unconstitutional Article 5 of Ley 1774 of 2016 that referred to the Article 7 of the Statute of Animal Protection. Article 7 contains the seven activities that involve animals for entertainment that are exempted from the duty of animal protection. The practices permitted correspond to rejoneo, coleo, bullfighting, novilladas, corralejas, becerradas and tientas (all variations of bullfighting), cockfighting and all the related practices. Even though the court held that the legislature had fallen into a lack of constitutional protection towards animals, and stated that bullfighting was cruel and inhumane, it deferred the effects of its sentence and gave Congress a two-year period to decide whether bullfighting and the other exception established in Article 7 of the Statute of Animal Protection will continue to be legally allowed. If after this period, the Congress has not legislated on the matter, decision C-041, 2017 will take full effect and bullfighting along with all the practices established in Article 7 will be considered illegal.