United States

Summary: Appellant Crystal Houk challenges her convictions and sentences for animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty on several grounds. Appellant contends her dual convictions for those crimes violate double jeopardy because animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are degree variants under section 775.021(4)(b)2. The conviction stems from Houk leaving her dog Gracie May in a car in a Walmart parking lot with the windows closed on a hot, humid day in Florida for over an hour. Apparently, Appellant had pressed a PVC pipe against the accelerator to keep the car accelerating since there was something wrong with the air conditioner. When employees gained entry to her vehicle, they discovered the A/C was actually blowing hot air and the dog was in great distress. Gracie died soon thereafter from heat stroke. A postmortem examination revealed her internal temperature was above 109.9 degrees. Houk was charged with aggravated animal cruelty and animal cruelty, tried by jury, and convicted. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of thirty-six months of probation on Count 1 and twelve months of probation on Count 2, each with a condition that she serve thirty days in jail. On appeal here, this court first found that the offenses of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty satisfy the Blockburger same elements test and do not fall under the identical elements of proof or subsumed-within exceptions. However, as to the degree variant exception, the court agreed with Appellant that the offense of animal cruelty and aggravated animal cruelty are not based on entirely different conduct and a violation of one subsection would also constitute a violation of the other. Additionally, while another statutory section allows the charging of separate offenses for multiple acts or acts against more than one animal, the section does not authorize "the charging of separate offenses or the imposition of multiple punishments when a single act against one animal satisfies both subsections." Accordingly, the court agreed with Appellant and reversed her conviction for animal cruelty (while keeping the higher degree conviction of aggravated cruelty).

Summary: This Maryland case examines the scope of compensatory damages available forf the tortious injury or death of a pet under Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 11-110, a law that allow pet owner to recover damages for the tort-based death or injury of their pet up to a capped level. The incident giving rise to this case occurred when Anne Arundel County Police Officer Rodney Price shot Micheal Reeves' dog in the front yard of Mr. Reeves' home. Officer Price was going door-to-door inquiring with residents after a recent spate of burglaries. Mr. Reeves' dog Vern burst from the front storm door and put his paw on the officer's forearm. While Officer Price stepped back and pushed the dog away, he testified that he did not vocalize any commands to the dog at that time, and, instead, decided to shoot the dog. Testimony by a veterinary pathologist at trial revealed that, if the dog were going for the officer's face as Price testified, this would have been improbable based on the dog's size as compared to the officer. Further, there was no dirt on that area of the officer's arm/chest nor any marks from the dog's paws. After a jury trial, a verdict was returned in favor of Mr. Reeves for $10,000 for the trespass to chattel claim, and $500,000 in economic damages and $750,000 in noneconomic damages for the gross negligence claim. The circuit court then reduced the gross negligence damages to $200,000 pursuant to the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). CJP § 5-301 et seq. The circuit court also reduced the trespass to chattel damages to $7,500 pursuant to the then-applicable damages cap in CJP § 11-110.1. The Court of Special Appeals held in an unreported divided decision that the statute did not bar recovery of noneconomic damages. On appeal here, this court now holds that CJP § 11-110 limits the recovery for compensatory damages to the amount specified by that statute and does not allow for recovery of noneconomic compensatory damages. And while the court found there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Officer Price was grossly negligent, it also held that Mr. Reeves could not recover these damages due to Maryland's single recovery rule. As a matter of first impression, this court found CJP § 11-110's plain language evinces an intent to exclude those things not expressed in the statute. In other words, because the legislature defined the specific types of compensatory damages it allows, it intended to exclude other forms of damages like noneconomic damages. Further, the court found the plaintiff's reading of the statute "illogical" because economic damages would be capped, but yet noneconomic damages would not be. Thus, it would be up to the General Assembly to expressly provide for noneconomic damages in amendments to the statute. The court ultimately concluded that the statute defines and caps the recovery of compensatory damages in the case of the tortious death or injury of a pet and the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The dissent noted the majority decision created a "double anomaly" in Maryland law by capping damages for victims of a tortfeasor who kills their dog but allowing a fraudster who intentionally tricks a family into selling a painting of their dog unlimited damages. Further, the dissent argued the majority ignored both judicial and ethical trends regarding pets in society and disregards the legislative debate when the statute was re-enacted showing an intent to include higher damages amounts.

Summary: This Colorado statute relates to mandatory reporting for child abuse or neglect. With respect to animal-related issues, the statute requires veterinarians, officers and agents of the state bureau of animal protection, and animal control officers to report suspected abuse or neglect as described in the law.

Summary: This Maine statute relates to mandatory reporting of suspected child abuse or neglect and permissive reporting of suspected animal abuse or neglect. With regard to animal-related issues, subsection (1)(A)(29) requires a humane agent employed by the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry to report suspected child abuse or neglect as outlined in the statute. Subsection (1-A) makes an animal control officer (as defined in Title 7, section 3907, subsection 4) a "permitted reporter" who may report to the department when that person knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been or is likely to be abused or neglected. Finally, subsection (6) allows all the described reporters in subsection (1) to be permissive reporters of suspected animal cruelty, abuse, or neglect. These individuals may report a reasonable suspicion of animal cruelty, abuse or neglect to the local animal control officer or to the animal welfare program of the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry.

Summary: This California law states that any employee of a county child or adult protective services agency, while acting in his or her professional capacity or within the scope of his or her employment, who has knowledge of or observes an animal whom he or she knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of cruelty, abuse, or neglect, may report the known or reasonably suspected animal cruelty, abuse, or neglect to the entity or entities that investigate reports of animal cruelty, abuse, and neglect in that county. The statute details requirements for the reports.

Summary: This Virginia statute relates to mandated reporting of suspected child abuse or neglect. With respect to animal-related issues, subsection (A)(8) requires any law-enforcement officer or animal control officer to report suspected child abuse or neglect as outlined in the statute.

Summary: This Louisiana law states that any state or local law enforcement officer, or any employee of government or of a government contractor who in his professional capacity routinely investigates alleged abuse or neglect or sexual abuse of a child, or abuse or neglect of an adult, who becomes aware of evidence of neglect or abuse of an animal shall report such incident to the law enforcement authority of the governing authority in which the incident has occurred or the local animal welfare authority.

Summary: This Illinois law states that Investigation Specialists, Intact Family Specialists, and Placement Specialists employed by the Department of Children and Family Services who reasonably believe that an animal observed by them when in their professional or official capacity is being abused or neglected in violation of the Humane Care for Animals Act must immediately make a written or oral report to the Department of Agriculture's Bureau of Animal Health and Welfare.

Summary: In paragraph (S) of this Missouri regulation, the state prohibits computer-assisted, remote hunting. "Except as otherwise permitted in this Code, wildlife may be taken only in the immediate physical presence of the taker and may not be taken by use of computer-assisted remote hunting devices . . ."

Summary: It is unlawful in Oregon to engage in computer-assisted hunting (Internet hunting) or provide or operate facilities for computer-assisted hunting in Oregon. As used in this act, “computer-assisted hunting” (Internet hunting) means the use of a computer or any other device, equipment, or software to remotely control the aiming and discharge of a firearm, bow, or any other weapon to hunt any game bird, wildlife, game mammal, or other mammal, and “facilities for computer-assisted remote hunting” means real property and improvements on the property associated with hunting, including hunting blinds, offices and rooms equipped to facilitate computer-assisted remote hunting. Nothing in subsection (8) of this section prohibits the use of computer-assisted hunting by employees or agents of county, state or federal agencies while acting in their official capacities.