United States

Summary: Animal Outlook (“AO”) appealed from the order that dismissed its petition for review of the disapproval of the Franklin County District Attorney's Office (“DA”) of multiple private criminal complaints. The requested charges stem from information obtained from an undercover agent who was employed at Martin Farms, where she captured video of cruel mistreatment of animals on the farm that AO contends constituted criminal animal cruelty. These data were complied into a table of 327 incidents, a letter of support from a veterinarian, and a legal memorandum that detailed how these incidents violated Pennsylvania law. AO submitted the gathered information to the pertinent authorities in January 2019 and the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) initiated an investigation which concluded more than a year later. Ultimately, the PSP issued a press release in March 2020 that indicated that the District Attorney had declined prosecution. After this, AO drafted private criminal complaints that were submitted to the Magisterial District Judge who concluded that the DA correctly determined that there was not enough evidence for prosecution. AO then filed a petition of review of the disapproval of its private complaints pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(B)(1) before the trial court, which again dismissed AO petition for review. AO filed this appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. In reviewing the trial court's decision, the Superior Court found that the trial court committed multiple errors of law. First, the trial court did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to moving forward with a prosecution and gave too much credit to the evidence from the Martin Farms veterinarian versus the undercover agent's testimony. The trial court went beyond its role of determining whether the evidence proffered supported each element of the crime charged and instead gave impermissible weight and credibility to Martin Farms evidence. Second, the court made a point of noting that Martin Farms voluntarily changed its practices after the investigation, which had no bearing on the legal sufficiency for criminal charges. The trial court also addressed "only a hand-picked few of the alleged instances of abuse," especially with regard to ignoring the non-anesthetized dehorning of calves. Thus, this court found that AO provided sufficient evidence to show prima facie cases of neglect, cruelty, and aggravated cruelty with respect to the incidents. The court then analyzed whether the record supported a defense of "normal agricultural operations" defense that would counter the charges. This court found that incidents like the dehorning of cattle that already had horns fused to the skull and extreme tail twisting and shocking were sufficient to overcome the affirmative defense. The trial court's dismissal of AO's petition for review was reversed and the trial court was ordered to direct the DA to accept and transmit charges for prosecution.

Summary: Plaintiffs, five non-profit organizations dedicated to animal protection, food safety, and other advocacy issues, filed suit challenging Iowa Code § 717.3B, which they contend infringes on their constitutional rights. Specifically, these organizations contend that Iowa's new "ag-gag" law criminalizes their actions in gathering information through undercover investigations at animal production facilities. These organizations must misrepresent or conceal their identities to gather gather evidence of animal abuse and other alleged illegal conduct in day-to-day activities at facilities where they suspect wrongdoing occurs. Iowa Code § 717A.3B is the second in a series of laws passed by the Iowa legislature aimed at criminalizing undercover investigations such as the ones conducted by Plaintiffs. The previous law was challenged by these same plaintiffs and a permanent injunction was passed by the United States District Court. The defendants challenged the injunction in the Eighth Circuit, but before that was decided, the Iowa legislature passed the new section (§ 717A.3B). Here, both parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs contend that the new law violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because it discriminates based on content and viewpoint and cannot survive strict scrutiny. Defendants argue that the law does not regulate protected speech under the First Amendment or, if it does regulate protected speech, it is content-neutral and viewpoint-neutral and passes intermediate scrutiny. The court first noted that the issue with § 717A.3B, and other laws aimed at prohibiting trespassers at agricultural facilities, is the law seeks to single out specific individuals for punishment based on their viewpoint regarding such facilities. This law operates in a viewpoint discriminatory fashion because it prohibits the deceptive trespasser who gains access or obtain employment at an agricultural facility with the intent to cause “economic harm ... to the agricultural production facility's ... business interest" as opposed to trespassers with an intent to benefit the facility. Thus, Section 717A.3B does not focus solely on the right to exclude, the legally cognizable harm of trespass, but only on the right to exclude those with particular viewpoints. While the court noted that a state legislature may determine whether specific facilities—such as agricultural facilities, nuclear power plants, military bases, or other sensitive buildings—are entitled to special legal protections, the First Amendment does not allow those protections to be based on a violator's viewpoint. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and Defendant's was denied.

Summary: The Washington Supreme Court examined whether the trial court correctly considered whether animal cruelty may be designated as a crime of domestic violence. The incident stems from an evening after defendant insisted on taking his girlfriend's dog, a small Chihuahua and Dachshund mix, for a walk. The girlfriend testified that defendant had a history of disliking the dog and had previously threatened to kill both her and her dog. On that evening, two witnesses heard "a sound of great distress" and saw defendant making "brutal stabbing" motions toward the dog and then saw him kick the dog so hard that she flew into the air. After the witnesses called the police, the witnesses found the dog, still alive, in the bushes. Officers then transported the dog to a veterinary clinic where the dog subsequently died. One of the two witnesses had a panic attack at the scene and testified later that she continued to have panic attacks thereafter with flashbacks of the experience. Defendant was charged with first degree animal cruelty with a domestic violence designation and also two sentencing aggravators. The jury found defendant guilty of animal cruelty. The jury also found that Abdi-Issa and Fairbanks were in a domestic relationship prior to the crime, which allowed for a domestic violence designation. The jury returned mixed verdicts on the sentencing aggravators, finding that the crime involved a destructive and foreseeable impact on persons other than the victim, but they did not find that it manifested deliberate cruelty or intimidation of the victim. The court then imposed the maximum 12-month sentence for the crime of animal cruelty and an additional 6-month sentence for the aggravator. On appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the domestic violence designation and the impact on others sentence aggravator. On appeal here, the Supreme Court found that animal cruelty could be designated a crime of domestic violence. The statute defining domestic violence has a non-exhaustive list of what crimes can constitute domestic violence. While animal cruelty is not listed, the court found that testimony of defendant's prior controlling behavior coupled with research showing how abusers use violence toward their victims' pets to manipulate and terrorize victims was sufficient. As to the sentencing aggravator, the court found that defendant's actions had a destructive and foreseeable impact on the witnesses who saw the animal cruelty. Thus, under these facts, the Court ruled that animal cruelty can be designated a crime of domestic violence and that the jury was properly instructed that it could find the impact on others sentencing aggravator. The judgment of Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

Summary: Under this Oregon law from 2021, an emergency medical services provider may provide emergency transportation for treatment to a police dog that is injured in the line of duty, provided that such transportation for treatment does not delay or otherwise interfere with the emergency transportation for treatment of any human.

Summary: This case concerns the measure of damages for injury to companion animals in Wisconsin. It arises from the incident between the plaintiff’s 11-year-old dog and the neighbor's dog. Plaintiff’s dog sustained severe injuries that resulted in veterinary bills and related expenses for the amount of $12,235. Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to recover all veterinary and related expenses. Additionally, the plaintiffs contended that their damages were entitled to doubling under § 174.02(1)(b) as there were records that showed that the dog’s owner had knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities. Defendants’ insurer sought declaratory ruling arguing that under Wisconsin law, plaintiffs’ maximum recovery was the lesser amount between the dog's "cost of repair" and the dog's pre-injury fair market value, as it was the measure for personal property damage. The circuit court limited damages to $2,695, which was the amount conceded by the parties to be the replacement cost of plaintiff’s dog. In addition, that amount was doubled pursuant to § 174.02(1)(b). The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court and declined to extend Wisconsin's "keepsakes" rule to pets to provide different damages for pets that only have value to the owner. The court found there were “significant differences between an unrepairable and lost forever keepsake and an injured but "repairable" pet.” The court was also not persuaded by other states' precedent about allowing or denying veterinary treatment as part of damage awards and decided to continue to treat dogs the same as other personal property. On the additional expenses allegations, the court found them to be “expenses incurred by the Smiths to facilitate "repairing" their dog” that were subject to property damage limitations.

Summary: In this case, plaintiffs sought recovery for property damage and for emotional distress and loss of companionship of their dog Toto, who died as a result of a fire in the building where plaintiffs resided. Plaintiffs were not home at the time of the fire. Upon their return, they learned their dog had died as a result of smoke inhalation. Plaintiffs found Toto’s body lying on the road, covered with a sheet. Plaintiffs alleged that their dog, who they considered a member of their family, had died as a consequence of the defendants’ negligence in inspecting, maintaining, supervising, operating, and controlling the building. In its opinion, the court stated that there was a well-settled common law precedent that pets are personal property and for that reason, damages for emotional injury were not allowed when a companion animal dies. The court declined to follow the cases that considered loss of companionship in determining the value of a pet and dismissed the causes of action seeking damages for the emotional injuries the plaintiffs alleged were caused by the loss of their dog. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was granted.

Summary: In this case, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the defendant alleging damage to property, which included past and future veterinary bills, emotional distress, mental anguish, and punitive damages caused by the attack of “Ricky”, defendant’s rescue dog to the plaintiff’s terrier “Peanut”. Peanut's veterinary treatment cost over $14,000. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by both parties. Defendants alleged that veterinary expenses were not compensable in a property damage case. Additionally, defendants argued that there was no basis for recovery for emotional distress and mental anguish as noneconomic damages were not available for damage to personal property either. Finally, defendants contended that facts did not support an argument for punitive damages as this claim required conduct that is "outrageous" or the result of an "evil motive" or a "reckless indifference to the rights of others," Plaintiff’s moved for summary judgment as well. Plaintiff argued that defendants responsibility was based on 7 Del. C. § 1711 that makes the owner of a dog liable in damages for "any loss to person or property." However, the issue as to the measure of damages was not addressed. The court granted partial summary judgment for the defendant. In its opinion, the court stated that “under Delaware law, dogs were seen as personal property, and the damages to Peanut could not be measured as if Peanut was a human being.” As personal property, a dog is “subject to the same measure of damages as a sofa, a car, a rug, a vase, or any other inanimate item of property.” For that reason veterinary expenses in excess of market value and emotional damage could not be recovered. On the punitive damages allegations, the court did not find that the plaintiff had presented any evidence as to the defendant’s conduct that would satisfy the standard of behavior required.

Summary: In this unpublished case, plaintiff’s cat “Amor” was euthanized after being diagnosed with heart failure disease and saddle thrombus. At the hospital, plaintiff was visibly affected by the death of his cat, who he was allowed to say goodbye to. Plaintiff also talked and sang to Amor’s body until the body was retrieved. Plaintiff was informed that during the procedure Amor had bitten one of the nurses and that state law required a brain tissue sample to rule out rabies. Plaintiff informed the veterinarian of his wish to display Amor's body for viewing prior to cremation in two different instances. Neither the procedure or alternative procedures were explained to the plaintiff. At the body’s viewing, the plaintiff discovered that his cat had been decapitated. Plaintiff became extremely emotional after discovering his cat’s head had been disposed of as medical waste. As a result of the decapitation, plaintiff developed several severe mental health issues. Plaintiff filed a claim alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and bailment. The case was dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff appealed the decision alleging that the lower court had mistakenly applied the standard of the bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress, instead of a direct liability claim and error in dismissing his remaining negligence and bailment claims. The court agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. On the count of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court held that plaintiff’s claim did not fall under the "bystander" liability as his severe emotional distress arose after the passing of his cat and upon seeing his cat's decapitated body. Additionally, the court stated that plaintiff’s “emotional reaction combined with the fact that defendant was twice on notice that plaintiff intended to have a viewing of his cat's body prior to cremation established that defendants owed plaintiff a duty.” Defendants breached this duty by being on notice of plaintiff emotional distress and failing to properly inform plaintiff of the typical procedure of decapitating the cat for rabies testing, inform him of alternative testing procedures, and failing to request that the cat's head be returned after decapitation and prior to the showing. Suffering of plaintiff’s illnesses was still to be determined. The court found that the plaintiff “had pleaded a direct claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” A claim of bailment had also been appropriately pleaded since plaintiff had given defendants control of his cat's body and defendant returned it in a damaged condition.

Summary: This is an overview of how the law compensates pet owners for injury or death of their companion animals caused by the wrongful conduct of another person. Even though the rules for the award of pet damages vary from state to state, the traditional and governing legal approach only recognizes the fair market value of the companion animal, with some exceptions that have allowed the recovery of veterinary costs, and cost of services provided by the companion animal as well.

Summary: This New York law provides that, with respect to homeowners' insurance policies, no insurer shall refuse to issue or renew, cancel, or charge or impose an increased premium or rate for such policy or contract based solely upon harboring or owning any dog of a specific breed or mixture of breeds. This law does not prohibit an insurer from refusing to issue or cancel such insurance where a dog of any breed or mixed breeds has been declared a dangerous dog.