United States

Summary: Plaintiff-Appellant, Anna Dillon, a certified “senior dog handler” through a rehabilitation program for inmates in Ohio, was attacked by a dog named Roosevelt, a German Shepherd/Husky mix owned by an Ohio Reformatory for Woman (ORW) corrections officer. Dillon had previously interacted with Roosevelt without incident on multiple occasions, but in March 2018, Roosevelt attacked her, causing 16 puncture wounds. On March 19, 2018, while attempting to put on Roosevelt's leash and collar, he displayed signs of anxiety and suddenly attacked Ms. Dillon, biting her multiple times. After the incident, Roosevelt was removed from the program. In August 2018, Ms. Dillon requested records pertaining to Roosevelt but was unable to obtain his handler folder. The dog’s handler folder included the dog’s training history, breed, eating habits, type of collar, preferences, personality, demeanor, and incidents of aggression, and was retained by the handler assigned to that dog. Ms. Dillon filed a civil action against ODRC in 2020, alleging negligence and spoliation of evidence. The trial court found in favor of ODRC in a decision issued in September 2021. Ms. Dillon appealed that decision, asserting several assignments of error. In her first and second assignments of error, Ms. Dillon argues that the trial court's findings in favor of ODRC on her negligence claim were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court evaluated whether there was sufficient evidence to support the determination that Roosevelt was not a vicious dog prior to the incident. The court referred to Ohio's statutory definition of a vicious dog, which states that it is a dog that has killed or caused serious injury to a person without provocation. The court found that none of Roosevelt's previous behaviors, such as mouthing, baring teeth, or lunging, met the definition of serious injury as defined by the statute. The trial court concludes that Ms. Dillon failed to prove that Roosevelt met either standard before the incident. The court noted that no evidence or testimony showed that Roosevelt had attacked or seriously injured anyone before March 2018 and Ms. Dillon's reliance on the case of Pickett, which dealt with a traditional negligence claim - a claim that she had abandoned in this case - was not relevant. In her second assignment of error, Ms. Dillon challenged the trial court's finding regarding the negligent keeping of Roosevelt, but since the first assignment of error has been resolved, the second assignment is also overruled. The trial court did not make any findings regarding ODRC's knowledge or negligent keeping of Roosevelt because it found him not to be a vicious dog. As to the spoliation of evidence claim, Ms. Dillon alleged that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) willfully destroyed evidence, specifically the handler folder of a dog named Roosevelt, to disrupt her case. The court outlined the elements of intentional spoliation of evidence, which include pending litigation, knowledge of litigation by the defendant, willful destruction of evidence, disruption of the plaintiff's case, and damages caused by the defendant's actions. The court found that Ms. Dillon failed to prove the willful destruction of the handler folder or that her case was disrupted by its disposal. It was determined that the inmate-secretaries involved in the program managed the handler folders, and there was no evidence that ODRC employees reviewed or accessed them. A failure to follow records retention schedules is separate from a spoliation claim. The court concluded that the plaintiff did not provide evidence to support her claim of willful destruction or disruption of her case and that the trial court's findings were supported by credible evidence. The judgment was affirmed.

Summary: Several non-profit organizations, including Farm Sanctuary and Animal Legal Defense Fund, filed a lawsuit against the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) challenging their actions related to the slaughtering of pigs under the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs alleged three causes of action related to the humane treatment, handling, and disposition of downed pigs, violation of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, and arbitrary and capricious denial of a Petition for Rulemaking. The plaintiffs in this case filed two causes of action against the defendants. The first cause of action claimed a violation of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for failing to investigate and report on downed pigs to Congress. Specifically, the plaintiffs submitted a petition to ban the slaughter of non-ambulatory pigs, which was denied by the defendants who claimed that their existing regulations and inspection procedures are sufficient in ensuring humane treatment and preventing diseased animals from entering the food supply. The plaintiffs requested the court to issue a declaration finding the violation and to compel the defendants to conduct an investigation and report to Congress. The second cause of action alleged a violation of the HMSA and APA for failing to assess the need for regulations regarding the humane treatment of downed pigs and to promulgate such regulations. The plaintiffs requested similar relief as in the first cause of action. The Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Complete the Administrative Record, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Judicial Notice, granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. On appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated standing at the summary judgment stage, despite a previous ruling during the motion to dismiss stage. Article III standing requires plaintiffs to show (1) an injury-in-fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's actions, and (3) the likelihood that the injury can be remedied. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue both causes of action because they had not been injured by the defendants' alleged failures, and any relief ordered by the court would not redress their injuries. Regarding the informational injury, the court found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that it was sufficiently concrete to meet the requirements of Article III. The court also stated that seeking to ensure compliance with regulatory law was not sufficient grounds for standing. The potential availability of a report through the Freedom of Information Act was considered too attenuated to establish a concrete informational injury. Regarding the organizational injury, the court referred to a recent Second Circuit decision that rejected an expansive concept of organizational injury for standing purposes. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been forced to spend resources investigating and reporting on downed pigs, which they argue was the responsibility of the USDA. However, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had voluntarily chosen to engage in these activities and had not been required to do so by the USDA. The court explained that an organization must show an involuntary material burden on its established core activities, and the challenged law or regulation must impose a cost that adversely affects the organization's regular activities pursued in its organizational mission. Expenditures or activities undertaken by the organization's own initiative, without being reasonably necessary to continue established core activities, were insufficient to establish injury for standing purposes. The court found that the plaintiffs had not shown a perceptible impairment to their activities caused by the defendants' actions, and the expenditures incurred by the plaintiffs were not reasonably necessary to continue their established core activities. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not establish an injury in fact for standing purposes based on organizational injury. Even assuming the plaintiffs had standing, they failed to establish that defendants violated the HMSA and the APA by failing to investigate and report to Congress on downed pigs. The defendants argue that they complied with Congress's mandates and that some obligations are not judicially reviewable, to which the court agreed. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that the defendants violated the FMSA by failing to investigate and report on downed pigs as required by Section 1907(a). However, the court found that Section 1907 does not mandate that the Secretary investigate each and every species of livestock, and the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence supporting that reading of the statute. The court also found that the plaintiffs' challenge to the sufficiency of the reports was not enough to succeed on an APA claim because they did not establish that the defendants failed to take a discrete agency action that they were required to take. As a result, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the first cause of action. Additionally, defendants argued that they are entitled to summary judgment because the relevant statute does not require them to regulate the slaughter of downed pigs, and therefore, the decision is discretionary. The plaintiffs did not provide a response to this argument, and their failure to advocate for their second cause of action is likely due to the absence of any statutory requirement that Defendants ban the slaughter of downed pigs. The court examined the relevant statute, which provides that the Secretary shall promulgate regulations to provide for the humane treatment of non-ambulatory livestock if necessary. The court concluded that the statute grants discretion to the Secretary to determine whether to promulgate such regulations and that agency decisions not to take enforcement action are unreviewable. Thus, the court concluded that the defendants' actions were not arbitrary or capricious. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Complete the Administrative Record was granted; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judicial Notice and their Motion for Summary Judgment were denied; and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

Summary: This subpart concerns accessibility of aircraft and service animals. Per section 382.72, airlines must allow a service animal to accompany a passenger with a disability. They must not deny transportation to a service animal based on the animal's breed or type or on the basis that its carriage may offend or annoy carrier personnel or persons traveling on the aircraft. The next section describes the process for determining that an animal is service animal. If a passenger with a disability seeks to travel with a service animal, airlines may require the passenger to provide them, as a condition of permitting the service animal to travel in the cabin, a current completed U.S. Department of Transportation Service Animal Air Transportation Form.

Summary: This Washington regulation was amended in 2021 to allow dogs under the control of their owners to be in the outdoor area of the premises of a food establishment. The subsection, which became effective on March 1, 2022, states that dogs may be in the outdoor area if certain conditions are met. These include that the permit holder has an approved plan to allow dogs, the dogs are on a leash and under control of their owners, the dogs do not go inside the food establishment, the dogs are not allowed on furniture, the outdoor area is not used for food preparation or utensil storage, the food establishment provides food and water containers for the dogs that are not washed inside, food employees do not have direct contact with any dogs, the area is kept free of animal waste, and the permit holder ensures compliance with local ordinances. In addition, the permit holder may allow dogs in the INDOOR area of a food establishment if the permit holder has notified the regulatory agency in advance. The food establishment must only pour beverages from a food processing plant and serve "ready-to-eat" food options in original packaging and there must be signage informing customers that the facility allows dogs inside. The other requirements for the outdoor area also apply to indoor areas.

Summary: This Iowa regulation was amended in 2020 by adding subsection 31.1(14) to allow "pet dogs" on exterior premises of a food establishment, including outdoor patio and outdoor dining areas, provided the food establishment meets all of the listed requirements. These requirements include: having a separate outdoor entrance; not allowing food preparation in the outdoor area or storage of reusable customer utensils; mandating that food or water dishes provided to dogs are single-use and disposable or come from the pet owners themselves; prohibiting contact between employees and the dogs; making sure the outdoor area is kept clean; ensuring that the area is immediately cleaned and sanitized if body fluids are excreted; making sure the outdoor area is not fully enclosed; requiring the removal of disruptive pet dogs; and posting of rules at the entrance. These rules include the leashing of dogs at all times, the prohibiting of dogs in the interior of the food establishment and on furniture, and the requirement to notify employees if the dog deposits any body fluid.

Summary: This statute concerns the powers and duties of Delaware's departments of health and human services. A 2020 amendment in subsection (3)(u)(6) states that, "[n]otwithstanding any regulation to the contrary, the owner of a food establishment or beer garden may permit leashed dogs in the owner's beer garden or on the owner's licensed outdoor patio."

Summary: This Washington regulation generally prohibits live animals on the premises of a food establishment. However, subsection (4) now allows dogs to be present in the outdoor area of such premises if certain conditions are met. These include the permit holder (the food establishment) possessing an approved plan allowing dogs in its outdoor premises. Dogs must be on a leash and under control of their handlers. Dogs must not go through the interior of the food establishment and must not go on tables, chairs, or other fixtures. If the food establishment provides containers for food or drink for the dogs, those containers must not be washed in the food establishment. Food employees must not have contact with the dogs and the area musts be maintained so that it is clean of animal waste. Adequate signage must notify patrons of the facility's decision to allow dogs.

Summary: Wisconsin revised the State of Wisconsin Emergency Response Plan (WERP) in 2021. Emergency Support Function (ESF) 11 and Attachment 1 both relate to animals and disaster planning.

Summary: This excerpt of West Virginia's Emergency Operations Plan contains Emergency Support Function 11, Agriculture and Natural Resources. Within ESF 11, there is a brief mention of household pets.

Summary: These rules and regulations are established to provide minimum standards to govern all licensed or registered animal care facilities in Rhode Island. They serve as standards for the construction and maintenance of such facilities, the care of animals in those facilities, as well as the criteria for inspectors to use when conducting inspections for licensure or in response to a complaint concerning their operation. They are considered minimum standards that must be maintained.