United States

Summary: Plaintiffs adopted a basset hound from animal control despite the fact that the dog had been turned over by a prior owner to be euthanized. The basset hound, who attacked the plaintiffs on three different occasions without injury, attacked plaintiffs' other dog. When one plaintiff tried to separate the dogs, the basset hound attacked him. Defendant removed the basset hound from the home that same day and refused to return the dog to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking to recover damages for injuries, asserting causes of action for, among other things, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, products liability and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On appeal from the New York Supreme Court decision, the appellate court found that under the circumstances, issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiffs reasonably relied on defendants' misrepresentation and whether plaintiffs could have discovered the dog’s dangerous nature with due diligence. The appellate court also found that the contract clause at issue did not preclude plaintiffs from recovering for negligence because it did not “advise the signor that the waiver extended to claims that might arise from the defendant's own negligence.” The appellate court did, however, find that plaintiffs did not satisfy the “rigorous ... and difficult to satisfy requirements for a viable cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” The court also found that sanctions were not warranted.

Summary: This case arises out of an incident at the Dadeland Mall, during which plaintiff had a confrontation with security personnel that ended with her arrest. The incident was precipitated by the presence of a small dog plaintiff was toting in a stroller while shopping with her mother and daughter. Plaintiff alleged discrimination in public accommodations under the ADA, and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983. Defendants moved for summary judgment.The District Court denied the motion in part and granted the motion in part, finding that an issue of material fact existed as to whether the dog was a service animal; that the patron was precluded from bringing negligence claim premised on intentional torts; that officer's use of force in arresting patron was de minimis; and that the right to be free from officer's application of force was not clearly established.

Summary: Plaintiff and respondent Animal Legal Defense Fund filed an action against defendants and appellants LT Napa Partners LLC and Kenneth Frank for unfair competition, alleging defendants sold foie gras in their Napa restaurant in violation of California law. Defendants moved to strike plaintiff's claim pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing it was exercising its free speech rights by protesting the law. Defendants appealed the trial court's denial of the motion. The appeals court affirmed the lower court's decision because the ALDF demonstrated probability of prevailing on the claim that it had standing under Unfair Competition Law (UCL); showed basis for liability against chef; and showed probability of prevailing on its claim that owner and chef unlawfully sold foie gras.

Summary: Plaintiffs brought an action against the Defendants, challenging the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”)'s November 28, 2012 Final Rule designating 30,010 acres in Idaho and Washington as critical habitat for the southern Selkirk Mountains population of woodland caribou under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Specifically, plaintiffs alleged (1) that the Final Rule's critical habitat designation was arbitrary and capricious because the Defendants failed to explain how the limited amount of critical habitat designated was sufficient to recover this population of caribou and (2) that Defendants failed to provide public notice and comment on the substantially revised critical habitat designation before issuing the Final Rule. Defendants and Intervenors argued that the Final Rule satisfied the requirements of the ESA and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA").While the district court stated that the Final Rule's analysis seemed reasonably based on the best available science, it refused to make a conclusive determination on the arbitrary and capricious issue because procedural requirements necessitated a further public review and comment period. The court therefore found the error in this case was a procedural one resulting from the FWS failing to provide a period of public review and comment on the Final Rule's critical change in reasoning. The Court therefore remanded this matter to the FWS to cure the procedural error by affording the necessary public comment period and to consider anew the critical habitat designation in light of those comments.

Summary: Victim was attacked and killed by her neighbor's dog. Victim's husband, acting individually and as administrator of his wife's estate, brought action against dog owners and several government defendants, whom he alleged failed to respond to earlier complaints about the dog. The trial court dismissed the action against the government for failure to state a claim, concluding that sovereign and official immunity or, alternatively, the Responsible Dog Ownership Law (OCGA § 4–8–30), barred action against the government defendants. Husband appealed. The appeals court held the trial court did not err in dismissing the action against the county and its employees in their official capacities. The former version of OCGA § 4–8–30, effective at the time of the attack, provided immunity to local governments and their employees from liability for all injuries inflicted by dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs. The appeals court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the action against the employees in their individual capacities based on official immunity, however. By applying the former OCGA § 4–8–30 (2012) to dismiss the action against the employees in their individual capacities, the trial court implicitly rejected the husband’s constitutional challenge to the statute. Judgment was therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court to enter a ruling specifically and directly passing on the husband’s constitutional challenge.

Summary: This New Jersey law relates to liens on those who keep horses. The law states that every keeper of a livery stable or boarding and exchange stable shall have a lien on all animals left in livery, for board, sale or exchange (and upon all carriages, wagons, sleighs and harness left for storage, sale or exchange) for the amount due for the board and keep of such animal. The keeper has the right, without process of law, to retain the same until the amount of such indebtedness is discharged. Note that the law states “keeper of a livery stable” shall include, but need not be limited to, a proprietor of a stable, a trainer, a veterinarian, a farrier, or any other person who has a financial relationship with the owner of the horse.

Summary: This Rhode Island law states that when an agreement has been made between the owner of any animals regarding the price of keeping, the animals shall be subject to a lien for the price of the keeping in favor of the person keeping the animals. The person may detain the animals until the debt is paid and, if not paid within 30 days, he or she may sell the animals at public auction after giving written notice to the owner of the time and place of the sale at least six days before the sale. Additionally, a kennel, as defined in § 4-19-2, or a veterinary hospital which boards or grooms animals for nonmedical purposes, may transfer any abandoned animal in its custody to a Rhode Island licensed nonprofit animal rescue, animal shelter, society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, or adoption organization as defined.

Summary: This Texas law relates to veterinary liens for large animals, defined as livestock or a cow, horse, mule, ass, sheep, goat, llama, alpaca, farm elk, or hog. The term does not include a common household pet such as a cat or dog. A licensed veterinarian has a lien on a large animal and the proceeds from the disposition of the large animal to secure the cost of veterinary care the veterinarian provided to the large animal. The lien attaches on the 20th day after the veterinarian first provided care to the large animal and attaches regardless of whether the veterinarian retains possession of the animal.

Summary: Under § 1383 of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. § 1361 et seq., the Animal Welfare Institute (AWI), Whale and Dolphin Conservation (WDC), Cetacean Society International, and Earth Island Institute hereby petition the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce, through the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), to designate Sakhalin Bay-Amur River beluga whales (Delphinapterus leucas) in the Sea of Okhotsk as a “depleted” stock. As described herein, the best scientific information available indicates that these beluga whales constitute a stock that is well below its optimum sustainable population (OSP) and, under the MMPA, qualify for such designation. The evidence also suggests that the stock continues to decline and faces a number of risk factors, providing additional impetus for such designation.

Summary: The following is a list of petitions submitted by the Animal Welfare Institute (AWI) and other advocacy groups to United States agencies. These petitions seek changes to rule-making for various animal welfare issues and also seek designations under the federal Endangered Species Act. The provided links for each action give a summary and links to the actual filed petitions. The petitions are listed with the most recent one filed at the top of the page.