United States

Summary: The following regulations implement Virginia's exotic pet laws.

Summary: What makes each of us, as individuals, human to one another, or, more generally, what makes an individual creature human? We have not often had to ask the question because of the species line based on reproductive capacity and incapacity, although “degrees of humanness” were explored in the various eugenic programs of the last century. Now the biotechnological possibility of fusing human and other forms of life is presenting the question in a new and serious way. If the traditional biological means of defining species are no longer reliable, what other criteria might determine what is “human” and what is “nonhuman”? The issue is not just how to conceive of an individual hybrid presented to us, but how to act toward the creature, at the most basic level. Drawing on animal law and theory as well as the history of human eugenics in law and policy, Vining identifies criteria that may one day be used to gauge relative humanness, qualitative and quantitative. He observes that ultimately the difficulty of deciding or agreeing upon what identifies us as human will make even more problematic the current treatment of creatures deemed purely “animal.” In the end he suggests that what the human distinctively brings to the sentient world is general responsibility itself, and that wider contemplation of the real possibility of human-animal hybridization may lead to new ways of thinking about animals, in law and beyond. Human Identity was presented recently as a talk to a longstanding interdisciplinary faculty seminar at the University of Michigan. It is presented largely in its original form here, with footnotes added.

Summary: Animals have always been the subjects of litigation. Early legal literature is replete with cases that range from the conversion of a farmer’s cow to the debate about who owns wildlife, [1] from criminal prosecutions of humans for cruelty to animals [2] to criminal prosecutions of animals for crimes that they allegedly committed. [3] The purpose of this article is not simply to discuss the significance of individual cases involving animals, but rather to explore the roots of a large-scale, organized movement, which started in the early 1970s in the United States, spearheaded by attorneys and law students with the express purpose of filing lawsuits to protect animals and establishing the concept of their legal rights, regardless of the species of the animals or the ownership interest of humans. What we now call Animal Rights Law or Animal Law began when attorneys consciously considered animal-related legal issues from the perspective of the animal’s interests, when they began to view the animal as the de facto client, and where the goal was to challenge institutionalized forms of animal abuse and exploitation. Within the scope of a law review article, it is not practical to list all of the lawsuits filed from 1972 to 1987. [4] The goal of this article is to trace the beginnings of animal law as a legal discipline and analyze the thought processes of its leaders, how the surrounding animal rights movement influenced the direction of animal law, and how the choices that were made shaped the foundation and growth of this area of the law. This article is written in the first person, because I don’t wish to mislead the reader who might assume that I am a dispassionate historian. I am an animal rights lawyer; the people described herein are my respected colleagues.

Summary: Horseracing industry participants must be held accountable for the wellbeing of retired racehorses. In Part I of this article, I explore the historic role of the horse in American society, and explain how “unwanted horses” become neglected, abused, abandoned, or shipped across U.S. borders to be slaughtered. In Part II, I address the unique susceptibility of thoroughbred racehorses to becoming unwanted horses, and how the wealth and glamour associated with horseracing serves to mask the problem. In Part III, I outline the legislation pertaining to horseracing, arguing that it does not adequately ensure the welfare of ex-racehorses. In Part IV, I explain that the burden for caring for these horses falls to under-funded private horse Rescue/Adoption/Retraining facilities (hereinafter “RAR facilities”). In Parts V and VI, I employ a loss-spreading rationale and the reasoning behind the “special relationship” doctrine, contending that the cost of providing adequate funds to RAR facilities should be imposed on the Primary Financial Beneficiaries (hereinafter “PFBs”) of the horseracing industry. In Part VII, I argue that this financial burden should be placed on PFBs in the form of “Participation Fees” proportional to the PFB’s level of investment in the industry. In Part VIII, I contend that this mandate could be carried out by either private state racing associations, the National Thoroughbred Racing Association, state governments, or the federal government. In Part IX, I further explore the logistics of implementing such a scheme.

Summary: Abstract: In the last several decades, animal agriculture has experienced a dramatic shift in production methods, from family farms to concentrated industrial operations, with societal consequences comparable to the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century. The new confinement operations raise significant moral questions regarding the humane treatment of animals subject to modern methods that emphasize economics over animal welfare. The success of the animal welfare movement, however, hinges on whether society will adopt regulations, based on moral considerations, that are directly opposed to its economic self-interest. The situation is remarkably similar to the plight of child laborers caught in the transformation of manufacturing methods during the Industrial Revolution. This article uses the history of child labor reform to construct a model for how society enacts protections for politically powerless groups, such as children and animals. Using the insights of new social movement theory, the article concludes that animal welfare reform will require a complex mixture of resources, including the difficult task of norm development. While the path to such reform is long, the child labor history shows that success is possible.

Summary: This article traces the growth of the field of animal law from 1985 to the present. It tracks the effort by attorneys and law students in the United States and abroad to institutionalize animal law classes, scholarly conferences, animal law sections in state, local, and regional bar associations, as well as the American Bar Association. It provides a review of efforts to spearhead lawsuits, legislative enactments, initiatives, and other means to gain greater protections for animals. Section II of the article describes the development of an institutional structure in various sectors of the legal community. Section III presents a review of landmark lawsuits and legislation. The article concludes with a summary of the major lessons that have been learned.

Summary: The Journal of Animal Law & Policy was founded in August 2007 to provide a high-quality, widely accessible forum for the publication and discussion of animal law scholarship. The Journal of Animal Law and Policy went on hiatus beginning Fall 2014. The SJALP website states that it will continue to have the website accessible. For more on the journal, go to the SJALP web page.

Summary: The Animal Legal Defense Fund, and various other organizations and individuals, challenge Idaho Code § 18–7042 as unconstitutional. Section 18-7042 criminalizes undercover investigations of agricultural production facilities. ALDF alleges that § 18–7042 has both the purpose and effect of stifling public debate about modern agriculture and raises two substantive constitutional challenges against the State: (1) violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; and (2) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first found that § 18–7042 is both content and viewpoint based, and thus, must survive the highest level of scrutiny. The Court held that the law does not survive strict scrutiny because it "would contravene strong First Amendment values to say the State has a compelling interest in affording these heavily regulated facilities extra protection from public scrutiny." Even if the interests in property and privacy of these industries is compelling, the law is not narrowly tailored as it restricts more speech than necessary and poses a "particularly serious threat to whistleblowers' free speech rights." Finally, the Court found that the law also violated the Equal Protection clause because the law was spurred by an improper animus toward animal welfare groups, furthers no legitimate or rational purpose, and classifies activities protected by the First Amendment based on content. ALDF's motion for summary judgment was granted.

Summary: The Plaintiffs appeal from an order granting dismissal of their complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In 2014, Plaintiffs filed a civil suit under North Carolina's anti-cruelty "citizen suit" provision, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 19A–1, against King Kong Zoo. Plaintiffs contended that the zoo kept animals in "grossly substandard" conditions. King Kong Zoo is an Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”) licensed exhibitor of wild and domestic animals. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the applicable law here is the AWA and “N.C. Gen.Stat. § 19A–1 ... has no application to licensed zoo operations.” On appeal, this Court found in a matter of first impression that the AWA does not expressly preempt claims under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 19A. Instead, the AWA "empowers Section 19A to work in conjunction with the AWA." The Court also found no conflict of law that would preclude bringing the action. The matter was reversed and remanded to the Cherokee County District Court for determination consistent with this opinion.

Summary: A county police officer failed to securely fasten her police dog’s portable kennel; the dog escaped as a result and attacked an 11 year old boy. The father of the boy sued the county police officer, alleging that she failed to restrain the dog. The officer moved for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity. The trial court denied her motion and the appeals court affirmed that decision. On issuing a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. As a county police officer and dog handler, the Court stated the officer was responsible for the care and maintenance of the dog at all times, even when she was not working. For that reason, the allegation that she failed to secure the dog outside her home concerned her performance of an official function and was presumptively entitled to official immunity—with two exceptions to that presumption. Since the father had not contended that the officer acted with malice or with intent to injure anyone, the issue was whether the officer acted with negligence in the performance of a ministerial function. Since the county had not given the officer specific directions about the extent to which the dog should be restrained and since a generalized duty of care stated in a state statute and county ordinance was not enough to amount to a ministerial duty, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision.