United States

Summary: Appellant, Officer Zachary Elfreich, went to the home of Appellee Jamie Becker in order to execute an arrest warrant. When Becker did not surrender right away, Officer Elfreich allowed his police dog to find and attack Becker. Upon seeing Becker, Officer Elfreich pulled him down three steps of the home staircase, and placed his knee on Becker’s back while allowing the dog to continue to bite him. Becker sued the city of Evansville and Officer Elfreich under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officer used excessive force in arresting him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied Officer Elfreich's motion for summary judgment and the officer appealed. The Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, held that: first, under the totality of the circumstances, the force used by the officer post-surrender of Becker was not reasonable. Second, a police dog's use of the “bite and hold” technique is not per se deadly force. Third, Becker, was a nonresisting (or at most passively resisting) suspect when Officer Elfreich saw him near the bottom of the staircase and the officer should not have used significant force on him. Based on these factors, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity and a reasonable jury could find such force was excessive. The lower court decision to deny Officer Elfreich's motion for summary judgment was affirmed.

Summary: The appellant, John Dixon O'Malley was not charged with or convicted of any crime. However, he was issued a summons to determine whether his dog was dangerous pursuant to Virginia Code § 3.2–6540(A) and (B). The jury found O’Malley's dog to be dangerous under the Virginia Code due to attacking and injuring the dog of Randall Powell. O’Malley appealed the trial court decision to the Court of Appeals of Virginia. The Court of Appeals concluded that they did not have jurisdiction over the appeal due to being a court of limited jurisdiction. The Court relied on Virginia Code § 17.1–406(A) which provides that the Court of Appeals' appellate jurisdiction was limited to appeals from final criminal convictions. The Court of Appeals reasoned that no language in Code § 3.2–6540 characterized as criminal the proceeding to identify a canine as a dangerous dog. Therefore, the finding at the trial level that O’Malley's dog was dangerous was civil in nature. Because the finding was civil in nature, the Court of Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction over O’Malley’s appeal and the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Virginia.

Summary: This Virginia law was signed by the Governor on April 1, 2016. The law provides that no law-enforcement officer, firefighter, emergency medical services personnel, or animal control officer who in good faith forcibly enters a motor vehicle in order to remove an unattended companion animal that is at risk of serious bodily injury or death shall be liable for any property damage to the vehicle entered or injury to the animal resulting from such forcible entry and removal of the animal, unless such property damage or injury results from gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.

Summary: This Wisconsin law enacted in 2015 makes a person immune from civil liability for property damage or injury resulting from his or her forcible entry into a vehicle to rescue an animal or person. Immunity is provided only if certain conditions were met. The person must have a "good faith belief" that the person or domestic animal was in imminent danger of suffering bodily harm and used no more force than necessary to remove the person or animal. That person must have first determined the vehicle was locked and forcible entry was necessary, and that person must have dialed 911 or other emergency services prior to this action. In addition, the person must have waited with the person or animal until emergency services arrived or left information on the vehicle's windshield as described in the law.

Summary: This chapter of laws deals with the holding and care of animals that are rescued from a disaster area. The animals that are rescued are kept for a certain amount of time depending on what type of disaster are they are taken from. During the holding period, the animal shelter is responsible for caring for the animal and making all necessary veterinarian decisions. Any violations relating to this chapter of laws may be enforced by the State Board of Agriculture.

Summary: This chapter of laws deals with search and rescue dogs and their handlers. All search and rescue dog handlers must be certified by the National Association for Search and Rescue or another state or nationally recognized search and rescue agency. This chapter of laws allows for search and rescue dogs and their handlers equal access to all public facilities. If any person denies access to a search and rescue dog or their handler, he or she will be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than $300 or more than $1,000. If the search and rescue dog causes any damage while in the facility, the handler will be solely responsible.

Summary: This statute allows the keeper of a livery stable or any person engaged in feeding horses, cattle, hogs, and other livestock to place a lien on any of the animals that he or she cares for.

Summary: This statute gives municipalities in the state of Texas to establish and regulate pounds and the running at large of horses, mules, cattle, sheep, swine or goats. The statute also allows municipalities to handle the capture, impounding, and sale of any animal at large that is in violation of this statute. Municipalities may also impose penalties on the owner of the animal that is in violation of the statute.

Summary: In this case, plaintiff (proceeding pro se) filed suit against the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) challenging its management of wild horses on the Pryor Mountain Wild Horse Range (PMWHR). Plaintiff filed suit challenging BLM’s fertility control and gather programs. BLM argued that plaintiff’s claims should be denied as a matter of summary judgment. The court ultimately held that plaintiff failed to provide any “legal authority” or “jurisdictional basis” for the remedies in which she was seeking. The court held that BLM was within its own authority to rely on its own data and surveys of its programs and was under no obligation to review its programs based on plaintiff’s alleged observations. Finally, the court held in favor of BLM as a matter of summary judgment.

Summary: This administrative provision restricts the shipment, transportation and exportation of wildlife subject to limited exceptions.