United States

Summary: This law acknowledges the legislative findings regarding the use of animals in research.

Summary: In this appeal arising from convictions for trespass and conspiracy related to animal rights protests at poultry farms, the defendant, Wayne Hansen Hsiung, co-founded Direct Action Everywhere (DxE) and participated in "open rescues" at Sunrise Farms and Reichardt Duck Farm, where he and others entered private property without permission to document animal conditions and remove animals they believed were suffering. The defendant asserted that the trial court erroneously deprived him of presenting a complete defense by excluding evidence and jury instructions on his good-faith mistake of law predicated on the necessity defense. The court held that while the necessity defense was legally unavailable as a justification because the actions were premeditated rather than responses to an imminent emergency, the defendant was constitutionally entitled to present his honest but mistaken belief that necessity justified his conduct to negate the specific intent required for trespass with intent to interfere with a business (Penal Code § 602(k)) and conspiracy. The appellate court found that the trial court’s limitation of the mistake-of-law instruction solely to Penal Code § 597e (providing a narrow justification for providing food or water to impounded animals) and its exclusion of expert legal opinions on necessity violated the defendant’s right to present a defense, as such evidence was relevant to whether he possessed the requisite criminal intent. Accordingly, the court reversed the convictions for conspiracy to commit trespass (count 1) and trespass with intent to interfere with a lawful business (count 4) and remanded for further proceedings, while affirming the conviction for trespass by refusing to leave property (count 2).

Summary: In this zoning dispute, plaintiffs Kimberly Dunckel and Fairytale Farm Animal Sanctuary appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the City of Winston-Salem, which had prohibited them from operating a nonprofit animal sanctuary housing 60-70 farm animals on their residentially zoned (RS-9) property after an anonymous complaint triggered a code enforcement investigation. The central novel animal law issue was whether the city's classification of the sanctuary as analogous to an animal shelter or kennel—uses expressly prohibited in residential districts—and its consequent shutdown order violated the plaintiffs' fundamental right to earn a living under North Carolina's Fruits of Their Labor Clause and Law of the Land Clause. Applying the two-part test from Kinsley v. Ace Speedway, the court held that the city's actual purpose—preserving the residential character of neighborhoods to promote health, safety, and welfare—constituted a proper governmental purpose, and that enforcing the zoning ordinance against the sanctuary was a reasonable means to achieve that end because the commercial use (including paid events with hundreds of guests) altered the neighborhood's residential nature. The court further rejected plaintiffs' equal protection argument, finding rational bases to distinguish the sanctuary from residents with personal pets (non-commercial), home daycares, schools, and churches (uses integral to residential life or constitutionally protected). Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the city, concluding that while the plaintiffs were burdened, they were not entirely prohibited from operating the sanctuary elsewhere in commercially or industrially zoned districts.

Summary: In this Louisiana Supreme Court writ disposition, the plaintiff sought to hold the Bienville Parish Police Jury (BPPJ) liable for injuries caused by dogs running at large within the incorporated Town of Ringgold. The court held that under La. R.S. 3:2731, parishes have only permissive authority to regulate dogs, not a mandatory duty, and under La. R.S. 3:2773(B), the BPPJ—not being a listed law enforcement agency—has no duty to seize dogs inside municipal limits. Additionally, the court found that La. R.S. 3:2774’s requirement for parishes to provide suitable shelters did not, standing alone, state a cause of action for failure to seize the dogs prior to the incident, as that issue is better resolved by summary judgment. Accordingly, the court granted the writ in part, reversed the court of appeal, and reinstated the trial court’s partial granting of the peremptory exception of no cause of action in favor of the BPPJ.

Summary: The Georgia law on protection orders in family violence situations was amended in 2025 to include pets. Under amendments to subsection (8), a court may grant a protective order that includes provisions for the possession of personal property, "including the care, custody, and control of any animal owned, possessed, kept, or held as a household pet by either party or by a minor child living in the household or residence of either party." In addition, the order may order the respondent to refrain from harassing or harming a pet, taking or transferring a pet, and engaging in conduct that violates Code Section 16-12-4 (the state's primary animal cruelty law).

Summary: In this marital dissolution proceeding, the central dispute involved the classification of a dog as an emotional support animal and its impact on the equitable distribution of property. The court affirmed that, under Florida law, pets are considered personal property pursuant to section 61.075(1). The petitioner challenged the trial court's order compelling discovery into his medical records, which was sought to investigate the legitimacy of the emotional support animal certification. The appellate court held that while a party's general sentimental attachment to a pet is a factor for consideration, it does not automatically justify intrusive discovery into protected medical information. However, by affirmatively asserting his disability and the dog's role in alleviating it as a "special circumstance" warranting a disproportionate share, the petitioner placed his medical condition at issue, rendering some records discoverable. Nevertheless, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by ordering production without conducting an in camera review to tailor the requests and implement safeguards against the disclosure of irrelevant information. The court therefore granted the petition for certiorari and quashed the discovery order.

Summary: This law, effective August 6, 2025, requires health-related research facilities to offer dogs and cats to shelters, rescues, or internal adoption programs before euthanasia, unless done for research, health, or safety reasons. It grants civil immunity for good-faith transfers and mandates annual reporting to the Department of Agriculture on the number of animals transferred or adopted. The law defines key terms like “animal,” “health-related research,” and “chemical substance,” and it yields to conflicting provisions of the federal Animal Welfare Act.

Summary: The defendant, Amanda L. Bonia, was convicted of animal cruelty under G. L. c. 272, § 77, after a jury found that she unnecessarily failed to provide proper food, drink, or shelter to her dog, Kayla. The evidence at trial revealed that Kayla was discovered on the defendant’s porch in a state of severe distress, described by the animal control officer as “very emaciated, a lot of bones, just gasping for air,” with her “body functions appear[ing] to be stopping” during transport. Veterinary records from the animal hospital documented Kayla as having “[m]oderate to [s]evere” dehydration, an “emaciated body condition,” “severe diffuse muscle wasting,” and an unkempt coat with “hair loss over pressure points on [her] pelvis, hind limbs, [and] shoulders” containing mud, dirt, and “unidentifiable ectoparasites,” after which she was euthanized due to her ongoing suffering. On appeal, the defendant argued that she was prejudiced by two struck hearsay statements, that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the Commonwealth must prove she intended the dog to suffer, and that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. The appellate court held that the curative instructions were sufficient to remedy any prejudice from the struck testimony, and it clarified that the charged provision does not require proof of an intent to cause suffering but only that the defendant intentionally failed to provide the animal’s basic needs. While the court found the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction based on the failure to provide proper shelter, it concluded that the evidence including testimony that Kayla was repeatedly left outside without food or water on warm days and the animal’s documented emaciated and dehydrated condition was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unnecessarily failed to provide proper food and drink. The judgment of conviction was accordingly affirmed.

Summary: The appellant, Dr. Boehm, challenged her misdemeanor conviction for cruelty to a non-livestock animal under Texas Penal Code § 42.092(b)(3), arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove she unreasonably failed to provide necessary care to a bulldog in her custody during boarding. She contended that the jury charge erroneously included the manner and means of prescribing contraindicated medications, asserting such acts cannot constitute an offense under a statute criminalizing omissions, and that the charge improperly included the culpable mental state of recklessness. The court rejected these arguments, holding that the statute's definition of "necessary care" encompasses acts of care that are inadequate to maintain an animal's good health, and that the plain language of the statute includes recklessness as a culpable mental state. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a rational jury could conclude the appellant recklessly failed to remove the animal from its waste, resulting in urine scald and infected wounds. The court further held that the inclusion of the contraindicated medication theory was supported by expert testimony regarding the risks of administering Galliprant and prednisone concurrently. Finding no error in the jury charge and the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Summary: In Triumph Foods, LLC v. Rob Bonta et al., No. 2:25-cv-09063-CAS-AJR (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2026), the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted defendants' and intervenors' motions to dismiss plaintiff's constitutional challenge to California Health & Safety Code § 25990 et seq., commonly known as Proposition 12. Proposition 12 prohibits the sale within California of whole pork meat from breeding pigs confined in a "cruel manner," which the statute defines as confinement that prevents the animal from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely, or that provides less than 24 square feet of usable floorspace per pig. The court held that plaintiff's express and implied preemption claims under the Federal Meat Inspection Act failed as a matter of law because Proposition 12 regulates farm animal confinement standards to prevent animal cruelty rather than slaughterhouse operations, placing it outside the FMIA's preemptive scope. The court further dismissed plaintiff's dormant Commerce Clause claims, finding that the statute is facially nondiscriminatory and that plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that its "slaughterhouse exception" imposes a significant burden on interstate commerce. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process vagueness challenge was rejected on grounds that the statutory definitions provide sufficient clarity for persons of ordinary intelligence to understand prohibited conduct. The court also dismissed plaintiff's Import-Export Clause claim as foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent limiting that clause to foreign commerce. The dismissals were with prejudice as to the preemption and Import-Export Clause claims, and without prejudice as to the Commerce Clause and due process claims, with leave to amend granted.